ESMA_QA_889
Topic
EU-CCPs
03/05/2023
Subject Matter
Risk Committee (old CCP question 20 dated 21/05/2014)
Question
Pursuant to Article 28(1) of EMIR, a CCP shall establish a risk committee, which shall be composed of representatives of its clearing members, independent members of the board, and representatives of its clients. Employees of the CCP, external independent experts and employees of competent authorities may attend in a non-voting capacity. None of the groups of representatives shall have a majority in the risk committee.

a) Is it possible for representatives of other interests (for example trading venues served by the CCP) to be members of the risk committee?
b) How broadly must an individual represent the interests of the CCP’s clients in order to qualify as a representative of such clients on the risk committee?
Level 1 Regulation
Regulation 648/2012 - OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR) - CCPs
ESMA_QA_888
Topic
EU-CCPs
03/05/2023
Subject Matter
Application of the exemptions to Title IV of EMIR (old CCP question 19 dated 11/02/2014)
Question
Do the obligations on CCPs and their clearing members under Title IV of EMIR apply in respect of clearing members which are exempt entities under Articles 1(4) and (5) of EMIR?
Level 1 Regulation
Regulation 648/2012 - OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR) - CCPs
ESMA_QA_887
Topic
EU-CCPs
03/05/2023
Subject Matter
Use of margins posted by non-defaulted Clearing Members (old CCP question 18 dated 11/02/2014)
Question
(a) Can a CCP have provisions in their rules under which the CCP can reduce pro-rata the amount of variation margin it is due to pay clearing members with a positive change in their positions in order to cover losses resulting from the default of another clearing member (variation margin haircutting) where:

1. The variation margin reduction is limited to a pre-defined monetary amount (e.g. an assessment of up to EUR XX million per clearing member)?
2. The variation margin reduction is limited to an amount which is relative to the exposure that the clearing member brings to the CCP (e.g. an assessment of up to X times the clearing member’s prefunded default fund contribution)?
3. There is no pre-defined monetary or relative limit on the size of the variation margin reduction?

b) Can a CCP have provisions in their rules under which the CCP can use margins posted by a non-defaulting clearing member to cover a liquidity shortfall resulting from the default of a clearing member?
Level 1 Regulation
Regulation 648/2012 - OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR) - CCPs
ESMA_QA_886
Topic
EU-CCPs
03/05/2023
Subject Matter
Limited exposures of Clearing Members (old CCP question 17 dated 11/02/2014)
Question
Can a CCP have provisions in their rules under which non-defaulting clearing members can be called for additional funds in the event of a default of another clearing member where:

1. The size of the additional contribution is limited to a pre-defined monetary amount (e.g. an assessment of up to EUR XX million per clearing member)?
2. The size of the additional contribution is limited to an amount which is relative to the exposure that the clearing member brings to the CCP (e.g. an assessment of up to X times the clearing member’s prefunded default fund contribution)?
3. There is no pre-defined monetary or relative limit on the size of the additional contribution?
Level 1 Regulation
Regulation 648/2012 - OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR) - CCPs
ESMA_QA_885
Topic
EU-CCPs
03/05/2023
Subject Matter
Transparency (old CCP question 16 dated 11/02/2014)
Question
(a) EMIR Article 38(3) states that “a CCP shall disclose to its clearing members and to its competent authority the price information used to calculate its end-of-day exposures to its clearing members”. In some cases, particularly for OTC products, the final prices used to value trades may be combined from different sources, for example quotes from different market participants. Should CCPs also disclose these intermediate price inputs?

(b) EMIR Article 38(1) states that “a CCP and its clearing members shall publicly disclose the prices and fees associated with the services provided”. What are the criteria for considering that the prices and fees are publicly disclosed?

(c) EMIR Article 38(5) states that “a CCP shall publicly disclose any breaches by clearing members of the criteria referred to in Article 37(1) and the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article” (i.e. Article 38 of EMIR). Through which tool should the CCP disclose this information?

(d) Article 38(1) of EMIR states that “a CCP and its clearing members shall publicly disclose the prices and fees associated with the services provided”. What information regarding prices and fees must CCPs and clearing members actually disclose in order to meet the requirement to “disclose fees and prices associated with the services provided”? In particular, do CCPs and clearing members need to publish a numerical figure or would a narrative or qualitative discussion of the factors that will drive prices and fees meet the requirement under Article 38(1) of EMIR? Furthermore, should the publicly disclosed prices and fees be those for a brand new client with no history, the average prices and fees across all clients or the lowest prices and fees charged to a client?
Level 1 Regulation
Regulation 648/2012 - OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR) - CCPs