ESMA_QA_900
Topic
Ancillary activity
11/05/2023
Subject Matter
MiFID II Q&A on the Ancillary Activity Exemption
Question
Is the ancillary activity exemption under Article 2(1)(j)(ii) of MiFID II available to persons whose main business is the execution of client orders in physically settled wholesale energy products traded on an organised trading facility (C6 carve-out products)?
Level 1 Regulation
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) Directive 2014/65/EU- Secondary Markets
ESMA_QA_893
Topic
EU-CCPs
03/05/2023
Subject Matter
Review of models, Stress-testing and back-testing (old CCP question 5 dated 20/03/2013)
Question
(a) Stress-testing, back-testing and sensitivity analysis for new entities: What parameters, data and methodologies, time horizons should a new entity that applies for authorisation as CCP use in order to perform stress-testing, back-testing or sensitivity analysis, if the respective entity has no clearing members yet?

(b) Model validation for authorisation purposes: Is it compulsory for a CCP to conduct a comprehensive validation of models, methodologies and risk management framework before getting authorisation, in accordance with to Article 47 Model Validation (of the Commission delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 of 19.12.2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 with regard to regulatory technical standards developed by ESMA on requirements for central counterparties)?
Level 1 Regulation
Regulation 648/2012 - OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR) - CCPs
ESMA_QA_892
Topic
EU-CCPs
03/05/2023
Subject Matter
Access model (old CCP question 23 dated 7/01/2020)
Question
(a) When setting up models to access its clearing services (e.g. sponsored models, direct clearing models), whatever the purpose of such an access (e.g. to facilitate buy-side or small participant
access to CCPs, to allow for better capital treatment, or for other purposes)

1. can a CCP introduce a new category of entities which would have a direct contractual link with the CCP, mixing some of the clearing member and some of the client features;
2. who bears the responsibility to comply with the financial obligations vis-à-vis the CCP?

(b) Can a CCP set up a clearing model where a client (“the Client”) has the possibility to pay to the CCP the financial obligations corresponding to its positions in lieu of the clearing member?
(c) Can a CCP accept an individual as a clearing member?
Level 1 Regulation
Regulation 648/2012 - OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR) - CCPs
ESMA_QA_891
Topic
EU-CCPs
03/05/2023
Subject Matter
Ongoing monitoring of collateral requirements (old CCP question 22 dated 2/10/2017)
Question
Article 46 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 requires CCPs to accept highly liquid collateral with minimal credit and market risk to cover its initial and ongoing exposure to its clearing members. Article 37 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 153/2013 requires CCPs to monitor on a regular basis the adequacy of their collateral policies and procedures, as new market developments may require changes.

a) What types of market developments should CCPs monitor?
b) How can CCPs ensure the monitoring of these market developments is efficient?
Level 1 Regulation
Regulation 648/2012 - OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR) - CCPs
ESMA_QA_890
Topic
EU-CCPs
03/05/2023
Subject Matter
Prudential Requirements (old CCP question 21 dated 21/05/2014)
Question
Pursuant to Guideline and Recommendation 3(b)(v) of the ESMA Guidelines and Recommendations for establishing consistent, efficient and effective assessments of interoperability arrangements, interoperable CCPs are not allowed to contribute to each other’s default funds or other financial resources (as such are defined in Article 43 of EMIR). However, Guideline and Recommendation 3(b)(iii) provides that CCPs should assess, collect or have access to, the required inter-CCP resources necessary to cover credit and liquidity risk arising from the interoperable arrangement, including in extreme but plausible market conditions.

How should a CCP meet Guideline and Recommendation 3(b)(iii) in the absence of requiring the interoperable CCPs to contribute to its default fund or other financial resources given that a CCP’s default fund and other financial resources (as opposed to the margins it collects) are the means through which the CCP ensures that its financial resources are sufficient to cover extreme but plausible market conditions?
Level 1 Regulation
Regulation 648/2012 - OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR) - CCPs