(a) Are there exceptional situations where the cash penalty mechanism provided for under Article 7(2) of CSDR should not be applied?
(b) How should Article 7(12) of CSDR apply in respect of cash penalties due to, and owed by, a participant against which insolvency proceedings are opened?
(c) What reference data should CSDs use when identifying the financial instruments subject to cash penalties under Article 7 of CSDR?
(d) Should cash penalties apply in the case of settlement fails relating to transactions which were intended to be settled before the date of application of cash penalties requirements and which failed and are still failing on and after the date of application of cash penalties requirements?

(a) Is bilateral netting followed by aggregation of the amounts resulting in one credit and one debit amount per CSD participant in line with Article 17 of the RTS on settlement discipline?
(b) Which rate should be applied (the securities rate or the cash rate) for the calculation of cash penalties in accordance with Article 7(2) of CSDR and Articles 2 and 3 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/389?
(c) Should cash penalties be applied to settlement fails in the case of receive free of payment (‘RFP’) settlement instructions, receive with payment (‘RWP’) settlement instructions, or crediting payment free of delivery (‘CPFOD’) settlement instructions (as referred to in Article 13(1)(g) of the RTS on Settlement Discipline), which are put on hold?
(d) When should penalty rates for financial instruments traded on SME growth markets apply, as set out in the Annex to the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/389?
(e) Should the net amounts of cash penalties referred to in Article 17 of the RTS on settlement discipline be calculated and communicated only in Euros to the CSD participants?
(f) Article 3(2) of Commission Delegated Regulation 2017/389 provides that “The reference price referred to in paragraph 1 shall be used to calculate the level of cash penalties for all settlement fails, irrespective of whether the settlement fail is due to a lack of securities or cash.” What should be the basis for calculating cash penalties in cases where the settlement instruction does not include any securities or when its security component is not related to its cash component (e.g. when two separate and opposite transactions between two participants result in a settlement instruction that consists in a delivery with payment or a payment free of delivery)?
(g) Is it admissible for Member States or CSDs to apply cash penalties rates that would differ from the penalty rates set in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/389?
(h) Should cash penalties be applied from the intended settlement date (ISD) to new settlement instructions that are entered into a securities settlement system to replace failed instructions if penalties have already been applied to such settlement instructions between the ISD and the date on which the new instructions are entered into the securities settlement system?

According to Article 18 of the RTS on Settlement Discipline, the costs of the penalty mechanism that are charged to participants by a CSD should not be allocated on the basis of the number or value of penalties applied to participants, as it could result in a concentration of the cost allocation to a limited number of participants and be seen as a shadow penalty. Other related services, such as additional reports that may be requested by participants, can be charged separately to the respective participants.

Are bonds and commercial papers eligible collateral by EU CCPs under Article 46 of EMIR, and if so, under which conditions?

What is the meaning of ‘approval’, as referred to in Article 1(6a), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129? Is it an approval which follows a process similar to that envisaged in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/980 for prospectuses, or an approval which follows the process applied by relevant national supervisory authorities under Directive 2004/25/EC?