In EMIR, a CCP is defined as a legal person that interposes itself between the counterparties to the contracts traded on one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. EMIR defines clearing as the process of establishing positions, including the calculation of net obligations, and ensuring that financial instruments, cash, or both, are available to secure the exposures arising from those positions. The definition of a CCP, however, seems to be fulfilled also by entities that are not authorised as CCPs, e.g. by firms acting as prime brokers. Prime brokers typically interpose themselves between the counterparties on a matched principal trading (MPT) basis. When they do this for markets for which it is customary to margin positions, they determine a net position on the basis of which they ask margin from their counterparties. With these activities it could be argued that prime brokers fulfil the definition of a CCP under EMIR. Another example of this are investment firms that operate an OTF offering MPT for derivatives (explicitly allowed under Article 20(2) of MiFID II).

Questions:

1. Is an authorisation as a CCP pursuant to Article 14 of EMIR mandatory for any legal person established in the Union meeting the definition of a “CCP” and providing “clearing services” in respect of financial instruments, or is it limited to entities offering clearing in OTC derivatives subject to the EMIR clearing obligation and/or in exchange-traded financial instruments? In this regard, is the intent of the legal entity (to offer clearing services as a CCP) relevant?

2. Are there other constitutive elements (e.g. intent, type of clients (retail/wholesale), loss mutualisation, unilateral margin) of the definition of “CCP”, apart from the “interposition”, i.e. becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer, element (Article 2, point (1) of EMIR)?

3. What constitutes a “clearing service” in this context; should it be understood as “clearing” just as defined in Article 2, point (3) of EMIR or are there additional constitutive elements to be taken into account?

4. As regards the “interposition” element, where an investment firm (e.g. an OTF operator) executes transactions via matched principal trading (e.g. in accordance with Article 4(1), point (38), of MiFID II), do such matched principal trading transactions qualify as “interposition” (by the investment firm) for the purpose of the definition of a “CCP” pursuant to Article 2, point (1), of EMIR? If so, how would an investment firm (e.g. an OTF operator) using matched principal trading for the execution of transactions differ from a CCP?

5. Do CCP clearing services need to be performed by a separate legal entity from other regulated functions (e.g. the investment firm function), or can one legal entity perform CCP clearing services together with other activities (not linked to clearing) such as investment firm services?

The European Commission clarified in Q&A II.1 that, pursuant to Article 9(3) of SFDR, financial products tracking a Paris-aligned Benchmark (PAB) or a Climate Transition Benchmark (CTB) are deemed to make sustainable investments. Based on this clarification, can such financial products hold investments eligible under PAB/CTB requirements, which may, however, not qualify as sustainable investments within the meaning of Article 2(17) of SFDR under the relevant financial market participant’s own methodology?
Can the clarification provided by Q&A II.1 also be extended to:
- Financial products disclosing under Article 9(3) of SFDR that apply all requirements of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1818 for PABs/CTBs, but that do not passively track such indices?
- Other types of financial products that have a reduction in carbon emissions as their objective and disclose under Article 9(3) of SFDR (i.e. without tracking a PAB/CTB or applying the requirements applicable to these indices)?

In the case where a financial market participant, such as a fund manager (delegator), delegates the portfolio management of a fund to an investment firm (delegatee), is the delegatee investment firm subject to the same SFDR disclosure obligations for the portfolio management it performs for that fund as when it deals with discretionary portfolio management mandates with end investors?

Can derivatives settled in stablecoins—namely asset-referenced tokens or electronic money tokens as defined in Article 3(6) and (7) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA) - be classified as financial instruments under Section C of Annex I to Directive 2014/65/EU? More specifically, can such instruments be deemed to meet the criterion of derivatives settled in cash?

In addition, does EU legislation permit the use of unauthorised stablecoins – namely asset-referenced tokens and electronic money tokens that do not comply with Titles III and IV of MiCA – for the settlement of derivatives?

It follows from the first subparagraph of Article 106(1) of the UCITS Directive that any person approved in accordance with Directive 2006/43/EC, performing in a UCITS, or in an undertaking contributing towards its business activity, the statutory audit referred to in Article 51 of Directive 78/660/EEC, Article 37 of Directive 83/349/EEC or Article 73 of this Directive or any other statutory task, shall have a duty to report promptly to the competent authorities any fact or decision concerning that undertaking of which he has become aware while carrying out that task and which is liable to bring about any of the following: (a) a material breach of the laws, regulations or administrative provisions which lay down the conditions governing authorisation or which specifically govern pursuit of the activities of UCITS or undertakings contributing towards their business activity; (b) the impairment of the continuous functioning of the UCITS or an undertaking contributing towards its business activity; or (c) a refusal to certify the accounts or the expression of reservations.

Further, it follows from the second subparagraph of that Article that that person shall have a duty to report any facts and decisions of which he becomes aware in the course of carrying out a task as described in point (a) in an undertaking having close links resulting from a control relationship with the UCITS or an undertaking contributing towards its business activity, within which he is carrying out that task.

Finally, the following is set out in Article 12(1) of the Audit Regulation (Regulation 537/2014): “Statutory auditors or audit firms shall also have a duty to report any information referred to in points (a) (b) or (c) of the first subparagraph of which they become aware in the course of carrying out the statutory audit of an undertaking having close links with the public-interest entity for which they are also carrying out the statutory audit. For the purposes of this Article, ‘close links’ shall have the meaning assigned to that term in point (38) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council.“
- In cases where a UCITS management company and its parent undertaking do not have the same auditor and are located in different Member States, what are the reporting obligations of the auditor of the parent undertaking towards national competent authorities (in both Member States) in terms of findings concerning the subsidiary that could meet the aforementioned conditions set out in points (a) to (c), e.g. bringing about a material breach of the laws, regulations or administrative provisions which lay down the conditions governing authorisation or which specifically govern pursuit of the activities of UCITS or undertakings contributing towards their business activity? More specifically:
- If ‘that person’ expands the reporting obligation in the first sub-paragraph, does that also apply where a UCITS management company and its parent undertaking are located in different Member States?
- If “that person” expands the reporting obligation in the first subparagraph, is the parent company’s auditor required to report to the UCITS management company’s home NCA or to the NCA where the parent company is domiciled?
- How should the notion of ‘undertaking contributing towards its [a UCITS management company’s] business activity’ (as set out in the UCITS Directive) be understood? For instance, can a company, that is not an UCITS management company, under an agreement with an asset management company be considered to be as such a company, if it advises customers to invest in UCITS managed by the UCITS management company?
- How should the notion of ‘close links resulting from a control relationship’ (as set out in the UCITS Directive) between a management company on the one side, and its subsidiary or parent undertaking on the other side, be understood?
- How should the notion of ‘undertaking contributing towards its [a UCITS Management Company’s] business activity’ (as set out in the UCITS Directive) be understood?