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  5. Article 6 Risk Retention

Article 6 Risk retention

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1.  The originator, sponsor or original lender of a securitisation shall retain on an ongoing basis a material net economic interest in the securitisation of not less than 5 %. That interest shall be measured at the origination and shall be determined by the notional value for off-balance-sheet items. Where the originator, sponsor or original lender have not agreed between them who will retain the material net economic interest, the originator shall retain the material net economic interest. There shall be no multiple applications of the retention requirements for any given securitisation. The material net economic interest shall not be split amongst different types of retainers and not be subject to any credit-risk mitigation or hedging.

For the purposes of this Article, an entity shall not be considered to be an originator where the entity has been established or operates for the sole purpose of securitising exposures.

When measuring the material net economic interest, the retainer shall take into account any fees that may in practice be used to reduce the effective material net economic interest.

In the case of traditional NPE securitisations, the requirement of this paragraph may also be fulfilled by the servicer provided that the servicer can demonstrate that it has expertise in servicing exposures of a similar nature to those securitised and that it has well-documented and adequate policies, procedures and risk-management controls in place relating to the servicing of exposures.

2.  Originators shall not select assets to be transferred to the SSPE with the aim of rendering losses on the assets transferred to the SSPE, measured over the life of the transaction, or over a maximum of 4 years where the life of the transaction is longer than four years, higher than the losses over the same period on comparable assets held on the balance sheet of the originator. Where the competent authority finds evidence suggesting contravention of that prohibition, the competent authority shall investigate the performance of assets transferred to the SSPE and comparable assets held on the balance sheet of the originator. If the performance of the transferred assets is significantly lower than that of the comparable assets held on the balance sheet of the originator as a consequence of the intent of the originator, the competent authority shall impose a sanction pursuant to Articles 32 and 33.

3.  Only the following shall qualify as a retention of a material net economic interest of not less than 5 % within the meaning of paragraph 1:

(a) the retention of not less than 5 % of the nominal value of each of the tranches sold or transferred to investors;
(b) in the case of revolving securitisations or securitisations of revolving exposures, the retention of the originator’s interest of not less than 5 % of the nominal value of each of the securitised exposures;
(c) the retention of randomly selected exposures, equivalent to not less than 5 % of the nominal value of the securitised exposures, where such non-securitised exposures would otherwise have been securitised in the securitisation, provided that the number of potentially securitised exposures is not less than 100 at origination;
(d) the retention of the first loss tranche and, where such retention does not amount to 5 % of the nominal value of the securitised exposures, if necessary, other tranches having the same or a more severe risk profile than those transferred or sold to investors and not maturing any earlier than those transferred or sold to investors, so that the retention equals in total not less than 5 % of the nominal value of the securitised exposures; or
(e) the retention of a first loss exposure of not less than 5 % of every securitised exposure in the securitisation.
3a.  By way of derogation from paragraph 3, in the case of NPE securitisations, where a non-refundable purchase price discount has been agreed, the retention of a material net economic interest for the purposes of that paragraph shall not be less than 5 % of the sum of the net value of the securitised exposures that qualify as non-performing exposures and, if applicable, the nominal value of any performing securitised exposures.

The net value of a non-performing exposure shall be calculated by deducting the non-refundable purchase price discount agreed at the level of the individual securitised exposure at the time of origination or, where applicable, a corresponding share of the non-refundable purchase price discount agreed at the level of the pool of underlying exposures at the time of origination from the exposure’s nominal value or, where applicable, its outstanding value at the time of origination. In addition, for the purpose of determining the net value of the securitised non-performing exposures, the non-refundable purchase price discount may include the difference between the nominal amount of the tranches of the NPE securitisation underwritten by the originator for subsequent sale and the price at which these tranches are first sold to unrelated third parties.

4.  Where a mixed financial holding company established in the Union within the meaning of Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 4 ), a parent institution or a financial holding company established in the Union, or one of its subsidiaries within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, as an originator or sponsor, securitises exposures from one or more credit institutions, investment firms or other financial institutions which are included in the scope of supervision on a consolidated basis, the requirements referred to in paragraph 1 may be satisfied on the basis of the consolidated situation of the related parent institution, financial holding company, or mixed financial holding company established in the Union.

The first subparagraph shall apply only where credit institutions, investment firms or financial institutions which created the securitised exposures comply with the requirements set out in Article 79 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 5 ) and deliver the information needed to satisfy the requirements provided for in Article 5 of this Regulation, in a timely manner, to the originator or sponsor and to the Union parent credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company established in the Union.

5.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply where the securitised exposures are exposures on or exposures fully, unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by:

(a) central governments or central banks;
(b) regional governments, local authorities and public sector entities within the meaning of point (8) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of Member States;
(c) institutions to which a 50 % risk weight or less is assigned under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
(d) national promotional banks or institutions within the meaning of point (3) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 of the European Parliament and of the Council; or
(e) the multilateral development banks listed in Article 117 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
6.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions based on a clear, transparent and accessible index, where the underlying reference entities are identical to those that make up an index of entities that is widely traded, or are other tradable securities other than securitisation positions.
RTS

7.  EBA, in close cooperation with the ESMA and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) which was established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 7 ), shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify in greater detail the risk-retention requirement, in particular with regard to:

(a) the modalities for retaining risk pursuant to paragraph 3, including the fulfilment through a synthetic or contingent form of retention;
(b) the measurement of the level of retention referred to in paragraph 1;
(c) the prohibition of hedging or selling the retained interest;
(d) the conditions for retention on a consolidated basis in accordance with paragraph 4;
(e) the conditions for exempting transactions based on a clear, transparent and accessible index referred to in paragraph 6;
(f) the modalities of retaining risk pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 3a in the case of NPE securitisations;
(g) the impact of fees paid to the retainer on the effective material net economic interest within the meaning of paragraph 1.

EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 10 October 2021.

The Commission is empowered to supplement this Regulation by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in this paragraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

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