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May I ask you for further clarification of your answer to ESMA_QA_774.

Q1 :
The example in your answer shows the very specific example of deducting the performance fee from excess
performance before calculating the performance fee. The example is not the the normal calculation described
in the first bullet point where the performance fee is not deducted from excess performance for calculating
the performance fee. Correct?

Q2:
The normal calculation described in the first bullet point where the performance fee is not deducted from
excess performance for calculating the performance fee means that also a possible performance fee accrued
until the day before (D-1) is not deducted from excess performance because otherwise the mathematical
incorrectness which I described in my question still exists for the current performance fee calculation period
(usually the fiscal year of the fund) with the false result just not including the false effect for the day of
calculation (D). Correct?

Q3
In your answer you formulated the example where the performance fee is deducted from excess performance
for the calculation of the performance fee as follows:
EXAMPLE: According to the prospectus, the Management Company will receive a performance fee, equivalent
to 9% of the positive net earnings of the fund.
However, as you showed in your mathematical expression the actual, resulting performance fee is not 9% but
8,26%. As I mentioned in my question normal business as well as legal understanding of "x% of something"
always means that the result of x% is not deducted from the something before calculating the "final" x%.
Wouldn't the a.m. wording of the example be the right description for the performance fee calculation
without deducting the performance fee from the earnings before calculating it; and the correct wording for
the mathematical expression you showed rather be for example the Management Company will receive a
performance fee, equivalent to 9% of the positive net earnings of the fund after that performance fee is
deducted from the net earnings so that the actual performance fee is 8,26%?

What entities should be considered as Persons Professionally Arranging or Executing Transactions (PPAETs) for the obligation to prevent, detect and report market abuse or attempted market abuse under Article 92(1) of MiCA?

The question refers to the interpretation of the meaning of indirect holdings of other financial instruments (Article 13) for the purpose of aggregated notification (Article 13a).
National Competent Authorities request that the European Commission clarify the meaning of ‘indirect holding’ in the context of financial instruments other than shares (i.e., securities providing voting rights).
The TD explicitly specifies, under Article 10, the different cases of indirect holdings of voting rights that are subject to notification.
In the case of financial instruments not granting voting rights (Article 13 and its reference in Article 13a) there is, however, no explicit definition of those cases of indirect holdings; and no explicit link to Article 10.
National Competent Authorities have raised questions about the precise definition of indirect holdings in this context—specifically, whether a full “look‑through” approach must always be applied, or whether the limitation to the look‑through approach set out in paragraph 10(e) also applies to financial instruments. In particular, it is unclear whether financial instruments held by a third party in its own name but on behalf of the person or entity concerned—such as those described in paragraph 10(g)—should be excluded.

Is a prospectus required under Article 1(5)(ba) of the Prospectus Regulation (PR) for reverse acquisitions?

Unlike Article 1(6b) of the PR, which requires a prospectus for reverse acquisitions within the meaning of paragraph B19 of IFRS 3, Business Combinations, Article 1(5)(ba) of the PR does not explicitly address this issue.

How should the due diligence requirements set out in Article 5(2) of the ESCPR be applied by CSPs?