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| 15 July 2016 |

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| Reply form for the Call for Evidence  Asset Segregation and Custody Services |
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| Date: 15 July 2016 |

Responding to this paper

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) invites responses to the specific questions listed in the Call for Evidence Asset Segregation and Custody Services (ASCS), published on the ESMA website.

*Instructions*

Please note that, in order to facilitate the analysis of the responses, you are requested to use this file to send your response to ESMA so as to allow us to process it properly. Therefore, ESMA will only be able to consider responses which follow the instructions described below:

* use this form and send your responses in Word format (pdf documents will not be considered except for annexes);
* do not remove the tags of type <ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_1> - i.e. the response to one question has to be framed by the 2 tags corresponding to the question; and
* if you do not have a response to a question, do not delete it and leave the text “TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE” between the tags.

Responses are most helpful:

* if they respond to the question stated;
* contain a clear rationale, including on any related costs and benefits; and
* describe any alternatives that ESMA should consider

**Naming protocol**

In order to facilitate the handling of stakeholders’ responses, please save your document using the following format:

ESMA\_CE\_ASCS\_NAMEOFCOMPANY\_NAMEOFDOCUMENT.

E.g. if the respondent were XXXX, the name of the reply form would be:

ESMA\_CE\_ASCS\_XXXX\_REPLYFORM or

ESMA\_CE\_ASCS\_XXXX\_ANNEX1

***Deadline***

Responses must reach us by **23 September 2016.**

All contributions should be submitted online at [www.esma.europa.eu](http://www.esma.europa.eu) under the heading ‘Your input/Consultations’.

***Publication of responses***

All contributions received will be published following the end of the consultation period, unless otherwise requested. **Please clearly indicate by ticking the appropriate checkbox in the website submission form if you do not wish your contribution to be publicly disclosed. A standard confidentiality statement in an email message will not be treated as a request for non-disclosure.** Note also that a confidential response may be requested from us in accordance with ESMA’s rules on access to documents. We may consult you if we receive such a request. Any decision we make is reviewable by ESMA’s Board of Appeal and the European Ombudsman.

***Data protection***

Information on data protection can be found at [www.esma.europa.eu](http://www.esma.europa.eu) under the headings ‘Legal notice’ and ‘Data protection’.

# Introduction

Please make your introductory comments below, if any:

<ESMA\_COMMENT\_CE\_ASCS\_1>

The purpose of this letter is to provide feedback to this ESMA Call for Evidence on behalf of the [International Capital Market Association’s](http://www.icmagroup.org/) (“ICMA’s”) [European Repo and Collateral Council](http://www.icmagroup.org/About-ICMA/icma-councils-and-committees/European-Repo-Council/) (“ERCC”).

**ICMA ERCC:**

Since the early 1990’s, the ICMA has played a significant role in promoting the interests and activities of the international repo market, and of the product itself.

The European Repo Council (ERC) was established by the ICMA in December 1999, to represent the cross-border repo market in Europe and has become the industry representative body that has fashioned consensus solutions to the emerging, practical issues in a rapidly evolving marketplace, consolidating and codifying best market practice. Consistent with the fact that it is repo desks which can increasingly be equally considered to be collateral desks, it has been the ICMA ERC which has served to guide the ICMA’s work on collateral, providing support to its broader efforts and driving many of the ICMA’s specific collateral related initiatives. Thus, just as repo and collateral are intimately related in the market, so the ICMA ERC and the ICMA’s work on collateral are also intimately related. In recognition of these intimate relationships, with effect from 4 December 2015, the ICMA ERC has been renamed as the ICMA ERCC.

[Membership of the ERCC](http://www.icmagroup.org/About-ICMA/icma-councils-and-committees/European-Repo-Council/ERC-Members/) is open to ICMA members who transact repo and associated collateral business in Europe. The ICMA ERCC currently has over 90 members, comprising the vast majority of firms actively involved in these markets.

**Importance of Repo and Collateral Markets:**

Repo and collateral markets lie at the heart of today’s financial market system and are vital to its smooth functioning. This has significant implications for both financing, of business and governments, and the effectiveness of financial regulatory measures designed to provide financial stability – each of which will be adversely impacted if the operation of repo and collateral markets becomes impaired.

To further elaborate, the ICMA ERCC wishes to highlight that repo plays a vital role within the financial system. It underpins the functioning of secondary and primary capital markets, where corporate and government borrowers raise money to finance their long-term needs. The cost of borrowing in the capital markets will be increased in case there is not a well-functioning repo market. Repo is also the key component of the shorter-term money markets, which provide an essential mechanism to allow for the efficient management of short-term cash and collateral requirements. Since repo provides a secured means of financing in this market it is the instrument of choice, with market participants and public authorities keen to avoid the proliferation of unsecured counterparty exposures. In case the repo market is unable to fulfil this role, commercial banks would have no choice other than to conduct all their liquidity management through central banks.

The ICMA ERCC also observes that collateral now plays a key role in financial markets, in no small part as a result of official policy interventions designed to mitigate the risks of financial market activities. For these measures to work as intended, it is essential that there is sufficient collateral fluidity – such that the right amount, of the right type, of collateral can be available whenever and wherever needed. This needs a good infrastructure for the movement of collateral, but also a robust repo market, since the repo market provides the principal mechanism for the transfer of collateral.

**Challenges Facing Repo and Collateral Markets:**

The ICMA ERCC has published a number of papers to illustrate the importance of repo and collateral and in its [most recent paper](http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-term-markets/Repo-Markets/icma-european-repo-market-reports-and-white-papers/The-current-state-and-future-evolution-of-the-European-repo-market/) has drawn attention to the state of the repo market. The cumulative impact of the pressures being imposed on the repo market are such that it is already a market under significant stress. Given the role of repo and collateral markets at the heart of the financial system, this has negative implications for the smooth functioning of broader financial markets – which will, in turn, lead to increased costs and risk for market participants, including those corporates and governments borrowing to finance their economic needs. At the same time there also risks being a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of many of the measures put in place to improve the stability of the financial system, dependent as they are on high quality collateral.

The ICMA ERCC has chosen to respond to this ESMA Call for Evidence on Asset Segregation and Custody Services (ASCS) because the ICMA ERCC is concerned that the ASCS proposals risk further exacerbating strains on the availability of collateral, which will further add to the problems outlined in the previous paragraph.

**ICMA ERCC’s Response to this ESMA Call for Evidence:**

The ICMA ERCC has carefully reviewed the response submission being made to ESMA in respect of this Call for Evidence by the International Securities Lending Association (ISLA). In light of this, rather than itself articulating detailed responses to the individual questions posed, the ICMA ERCC has determined that besides articulating the overall concerns outlined above it is appropriate to limit this response submission to a specific and full endorsement of the detailed responses made by ISLA.

The ICMA ERCC respectfully requests that ESMA takes due account of its overarching concerns and its support for the detailed views expressed by ISLA and stands ready to discuss these matters further in case ESMA would find that helpful.

<ESMA\_COMMENT\_CE\_ASCS\_1>

1. **Please describe the model of asset segregation (including through the use of ‘omnibus accounts’) in your custody chain/the custody chain of the funds that you manage. Please explain what motivates your choice of asset segregation at each level (e.g. investor demand, local requirements, tax reasons).**

**In your description, please take into account the following:**

1. **please describe – with the use of a chart/diagram – at least three levels of account-keeping in your custody chain, as follows:**
2. **the first level should be the level of the AIF/UCITS-appointed depositary,**
3. **the second level should be the level of a third party delegate of the depositary, and**
4. **the second level should be the level of a third party delegate of the depositary, and**
5. **the third level should be the level of a sub-delegate of the third party delegate or the CSD, where applicable.**

**You may wish to add further levels of accounts, depending on your custody chain.**

1. **if you use ‘omnibus accounts’ (i.e. accounts, in which the assets of different end investors are commingled, rather than each individual investor’s assets being held in a separate account) at any level of the custody chain, please provide, in as clear and detailed a manner as possible:**
2. **an explanation including at which level of the chain you use them;**
3. **a description of the features of these accounts (e.g. whose assets are held in them, who holds title to those assets or is considered to be the end investor, etc. - e.g. AIF, UCITS, other clients, depositaries or their third party delegates);**
4. **an explanation on how any restriction on reuse of the assets applying to the funds (AIF/UCITS) which you have in custody/manage (e.g. the restriction under Article 22(7) of the UCITS Directive) is respected, when they are held in an omnibus account at a given level; and**
5. **the number or percentage of ‘omnibus accounts’ versus ‘separate accounts’ in your custody chain.**
6. **if you do not use ‘omnibus accounts’, please specify why and how far down the chain it is possible for you not to use them (i.e. whether this works in all situations or, if it is necessary to use ‘omnibus accounts’ at some level of the custody chain, at which level)?**
7. **in the chart/diagram to be provided under a), if applicable, please refer to the five options in the table under Q22 below and specify if your model matches or closely matches with any of the models described therein.**
8. **if your model makes any distinction between AIF and UCITS assets, please highlight the difference between the two in the chart/diagram to be provided under a).**
9. **According to a Briefing Note[[1]](#footnote-2) published by ECON in 2011, there are five basic models for holding securities with an intermediary: the trust model**[[2]](#footnote-3)**, the security entitlement model**[[3]](#footnote-4)**, the undivided property model**[[4]](#footnote-5)**, the pooled property model**[[5]](#footnote-6) **and the transparent model**[[6]](#footnote-7)**. ESMA is interested in gathering evidence on whether there may be any link between certain securities holding models and certain asset segregation models. Therefore, ESMA invites stakeholders to provide input to the following questions:**
10. **What securities holding model do you use?**
11. **Is such model the market standard in your jurisdiction?**
12. **Is the market standard model in your jurisdiction one of the five mentioned above, or a different one? If a different one, please provide details.**
13. **Does the model you refer to under f) i) require a particular way of segregating assets or omnibus accounts at one of the levels referred to at letter a) above? If yes, please specify.**
14. **Please explain the naming conventions (i.e. in whose name is the account opened) applied to the accounts with the delegates/sub-delegates of the depositary in the model described under answers to questions a) to e) above. Please also specify if there are instances where the accounts with the immediate delegate of the depositary are opened in the name of the funds.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_1>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_1>

1. **Please explain how, under the framework you have described in your response to Q1, the assets of the AIF/UCITS are protected against the insolvency of any of the parties involved in the custody chain (depositary, delegate, sub-delegate, – including prime broker – CSD) and – in case of use of ‘omnibus accounts’ – of their other clients whose assets are also held in this same account. In particular, what happens if a party, whose assets are held in another party’s ‘omnibus account’, becomes insolvent? Does this place at any disadvantage the other parties using the omnibus account who are not in default?**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_2>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_2>

1. **Please describe the differences (if any) between ‘omnibus accounts’ (i.e. books and records segregation) and separate accounts in terms of return of the assets from the account in a scenario of potential insolvency or insolvency. In particular, please indicate whether the assets may be transferred to the depositary or another delegate more easily and/or quickly under a particular insolvency regime from either of the two types of account and explain why. If possible and relevant, please (i) distinguish among the various jurisdictions of which you have knowledge and (ii) explain whether a specific type of account may have an impact on the timeline for the aforementioned transfer of assets or, more generally, on the order of events in a scenario of potential insolvency or insolvency.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_3>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_3>

1. **Should you consider that asset segregation pursuant to options 1 and 2 of the CP does not provide any additional protection to the existing arrangements you described in your response to Q1 in case of insolvency, and that these arrangements provide adequate investor protection, please explain which aspects of the regime contribute to meeting the policy objective through measures including:**
2. **effective reconciliation,**
3. **traceability (e.g. books and records), or**
4. **any other means (e.g. legal mechanisms).**

**Please justify your response and provide details on what any of the means under i) to iii) consist of.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_4>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_4>

1. **In the chart below (option 1 of the CP), AIF 1 would only have recourse against Depositary 1 under the PRIMA concept.**
2. **In the event of, for instance, a default of Depositary 2, would separate accounts at the level of the Delegate make it easier for Depositary 1 to enforce the rights in respect of the assets held in the account on its behalf against the Delegate?**

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1. **In the event of the default of the Delegate, would separate accounts at the level of the Delegate make it easier for Depositary 1 and Depositary 2 to enforce their rights in respect of the assets held in the account on their behalf against the Delegate or its liquidators?**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_5>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_5>

1. **Many respondents to the CP argued that, in an insolvency scenario, imposing a model where investors have individual accounts throughout the custody chain would not necessarily provide any particular benefit over the use of IT book segregation in an omnibus account (i.e. books and records instead of separate accounts). Please explain how the level of protection indicated in the policy objective at the start of this paper can be achieved through the use of omnibus accounts. Please also:**
2. **describe how segregation in books and records would ensure the aforementioned investor protection;**
3. **provide an example of how such books and records are used in insolvency proceedings to trace and return client securities when omnibus accounts are used; and**
4. **explain how the above-mentioned segregation in books and records would address any of the risks of ‘omnibus accounts’ mentioned in recent IOSCO work[[7]](#footnote-8).**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_6>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_6>

1. **Please describe the impact of settlement process and account structures on the different levels through the custody chain in the case of**

* **Cross-border investments**
* **Through CSD Links**
* **In relation to cross-border investments through CSD links, what are the functions of an investor CSD[[8]](#footnote-9)?**
* **Through T2S**
* **Prime broker services**
* **Tri-party collateral management / securities lending.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_7>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_7>

1. **It has been argued that each time a new end investor or new AIF or UCITS is added as a customer, instead of one new account being created, many new accounts would need to be created at multiple levels in the chain of custody. If you agree with this statement, please provide further details of how this would work in practice.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_8>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_8>

1. **If the number of accounts were increased, what effect would it have on the efficiency of settlement operations (e.g. the ability to net off transactions)?**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_9>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_9>

1. **Many respondents to the CP argued that option 1 in the CP would prevent asset managers from:**
2. **executing block trades; and**
3. **benefiting from internalised settlements (settling across the account provider’s own books rather than the books of the sub-delegate).**

**If you agree with the statements under a) or b), please explain the relevant issue.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_10>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_10>

1. **Many CP respondents indicated that the costs associated with option 1 are very significant. Please provide further data on quantifying the cost impact (including one-off and on-going) of option 1 on AIFs/UCITS (and their shareholders), depositaries, global custodians, prime brokers, delegates, their clients and the different markets?**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_11>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_11>

1. **Are there any advantages of using omnibus accounts not covered in your responses to other questions?**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_12>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_12>

1. **Please consider the case where a third-party delegate or sub-delegate in the custody chain also acts as a clearing member under EMIR. What would be the impact (if any) of the interaction between the approaches described under each of the options in the table under Q22 below and the choices provided for under Article 39 (2) and (3) of EMIR[[9]](#footnote-10) (including if this may raise any operational difficulties)? Should you consider that there is any impact, please explain why.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_13>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_13>

1. **Please describe the functioning of the following arrangements and clarify the operational reasons why, and the extent to which, the segregation requirements under option 1 would affect them:**
2. **tri-party collateral management arrangements;**
3. **prime brokerage arrangements.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_14>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_14>

1. **Are you able to source any data on quantifying the additional costs and market impact for prime brokers and/or collateral managers as a result of implementing option 1?**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_15>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_15>

1. **Many respondents to the CP argued that the requirements under option 1 would trigger ‘legal certainty risk’ and ‘attendant operational risk’ in relation to collateral management. Should you agree with these statements, please specify what precisely you understand by “legal certainty risk and “attendant operational risk”. How could those risks be mitigated?**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_16>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_16>

1. **Could adaptations to IT systems help to face the challenges that option 1 represents in relation to collateral management? If so, please explain how, if possible indicating the costs and timescales of the work that would be needed.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_17>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_17>

1. **Have you identified any operational (or other) challenges in terms of the impact of the requirements under option 1 of the CP for the functioning and efficiency of T2S? If your answer is yes, please explain in detail.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_18>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_18>

1. **Many respondents to the CP argued that AIFs risk being shut out of key markets due to the following:**
2. **the mismatch that will arise between local jurisdiction securities ownership rules and the mandated level of segregation required under option 1 in the CP; and/or**
3. **the requirement in certain countries to hold omnibus accounts across multiple depositaries, as is the case for certain stock exchanges.**

**If you agree with the above statement, please explain your concern with reference to specific jurisdictions and/or stock exchanges and the relevant requirements.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_19>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_19>

1. **Should you/the funds that you manage comply with option 1 in the CP, please provide details on if and how you apply the requirements under this option when delegating safe-keeping duties to third parties outside the EU.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_20>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_20>

1. **Many respondents to the CP argued that, given that many delegated third parties are located outside of the EU, option 1 of the CP could lead to higher fees charged by the delegated parties. Are you able to source any data on the potential higher fees charged by the delegated parties outside the EU as a result of implementing option 1?**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_21>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_21>

1. **How would you compare and contrast the five options in the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of the CP in terms of achieving the policy objective described in the above introduction? In your opinion, does any one of the options offer a better solution for achieving this aim, and if so, how? In answering to these questions, please refer to the table below which is copied from the CBA of the CP and adds the sub-delegate level.**

**Please note that as the present call for evidence is intended to cover asset segregation requirements for both AIFs and UCITS, with regard to the latter any reference in the table below to ‘AIF’ should also be read as ‘UCITS’, i.e. when applied to UCITS, references to ‘AIF’ should be read as ‘UCITS’ and references to ‘non-AIF’ should be read as ‘non-UCITS’.**

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| **Option 1** | AIF and non-AIF assets should not be mixed in the same account and there should be separate accounts for AIF assets of each depositary when a delegate is holding assets for multiple depositary clients.  When the delegate appoints a sub-delegate, this should hold separate accounts for AIF assets of each depositary and should not mix in the same account non-AIF assets of that depositary or AIF assets coming from different depositaries. |
| **Option 2** | The separation of AIF and non-AIF assets should be required, but it would be possible to combine AIF assets of multiple depositaries into a single account at delegate or sub-delegate level. |
| **Option 3** | AIF and non-AIF assets could be commingled in the account on which the AIF’s assets are to be kept at the level of the delegate. However, the delegate could not commingle in this account assets coming from different depositaries.  When the delegate appoints a sub-delegate, this should hold separate accounts for assets coming from different depositaries. However, AIF and non-AIF assets could be commingled in the account of a given depositary in which the AIF’s assets are to be kept at the level of the sub-delegate. |
| **Option 4** | AIF and non-AIF assets could be commingled in the account on which the AIF’s assets are to be kept at the level of the delegate. The delegate could commingle in this account assets coming from different depositary clients.  When the delegate appoints a sub-delegate, this could commingle in the same account AIF and non-AIF assets and assets coming from different depositaries and the delegates’ clients (but should not be mixed with the delegate’s or depositaries’ own assets). |
| **Option 5** | AIF assets should be segregated on an AIF-by-AIF basis at the level of the delegate or sub- delegate. |

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_22>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_22>

1. **Articles 38(3) and (4) of the CSDR state that a CSD shall offer its participants the choice between:**
2. **‘omnibus client segregation’ at the CSD level (holding in one securities account the securities that belong to different clients of that participant);**
3. **‘individual client segregation’ at the CSD level (segregating the securities of any of the participant’s clients, if and as required by the participant).**

**In addition, under Article 38 (5) of CSDR, a participant shall offer its clients at least the choice between omnibus client segregation and individual client segregation and inform them of the costs and risks associated with each option[[10]](#footnote-11).**

1. **Do you consider that a regime similar to the one under Article 38 of the CSDR but applied throughout the custody chain (according to which the manager of AIFs/UCITS, on behalf of their investors, informs the depositary of the level of asset segregation it wishes to apply throughout the custody chain to each individual AIF/UCITS, after having duly assessed the risks and costs associated with the different options) would achieve the policy objective described in the above introduction? Please explain why and, if the answer is yes, how.**
2. **Applying a regime similar to the one under Article 38 of the CSDR to the AIF/UCITS framework would mean that the fund investors would have the choice to invest in a given fund or not, after having been made aware – through appropriate disclosures – of the level of asset segregation that the managers of AIFs/UCITS had chosen and the related costs. However, investors would not have the opportunity to participate in the choice of the level of asset segregation as such a choice would have to be made by the manager for each individual fund as a whole (i.e. it would not be possible to have different levels of segregation for the investors in the same fund). Do you consider that this could raise any concern in terms of investor protection or could any concern be alleviated through appropriate disclosures? Please explain the reasons for your answer.**
3. **Please comment on any implications of such a regime for the account related provisions under Article 39 of EMIR.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_23>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_23>

1. **Please describe any alternative regime which, in your view, would achieve the policy objective described in the above introduction.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_24>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_24>

1. **Do you see a need for detailing and further clarifying the concept of “custody” for the purposes of the AIFMD and UCITS Directive?**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_25>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_25>

1. **If your answer to Q25 is yes, should the concept of “custody” of financial instruments include the provision of any of the following services for the purpose of the AIFMD and UCITS Directive:**
2. **initial recording of securities in a book-entry system (‘notary service’);**
3. **providing and maintaining securities accounts at the top tier level (‘central maintenance service’)**[[11]](#footnote-12)**;**
4. **maintaining or operating securities accounts in relation to the settlement service;**
5. **having any kind of access to the assets of the AIF/UCITS; or**
6. **having any access to the accounts where the assets of the AIF/UCITS are booked with the right to pledge and transfer those assets from those accounts to any other party?**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_26>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_26>

1. **If your answer to Q25 is yes, would you include any other services in the concept of “custody” of financial instruments for the purpose of the AIFMD and UCITS Directive? If your answer is yes, please list and describe precisely the services that should be included.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_27>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_27>

1. **Please explain how, in your views, “custody” services interact with “safe-keeping” services, in particular those referred to under Article 21(8) of the AIFMD (as well as Article 89 of the AIFMD Level 2[[12]](#footnote-13)) and Article 22(5) of the UCITS Directive (as well as Article 13 of the UCITS V Level 2[[13]](#footnote-14)).**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_28>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_28>

1. **If you consider that the provision by a CSD of any of the core services (i.e. services mentioned under Section A of the Annex to the CSDR) or ancillary services (i.e. services provided in accordance with Section B or Section C of the Annex to the CSDR) should not result in the CSD being considered as a delegate within the meaning of Article 21(11) of the AIFMD and Article 22a of the UCITS Directive, please list the specific services and explain the reasons why.**

<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_29>

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<ESMA\_QUESTION\_CE\_ASCS\_29>

1. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201106/20110606ATT20781/20110606ATT20781EN.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. See pages 14-15 of the Briefing Note. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. See page 16 of the Briefing Note. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. See page 17 of the Briefing Note. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. See page 18 of the Briefing Note. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. See page 19 of the Briefing Note. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. See paragraphs 29 and 30 of the [Standards for the Custody of Collective Investment Schemes’ Assets – Final Report (FR25/2015)](http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD512.pdf): “*Depending on the operational framework in the jurisdiction, there is a risk that CIS assets in the custodian’s care can become co-mingled with (i) assets of the responsible entity; (ii) assets of the custodian; or (iii) the assets of other clients of the custodian (although it should be noted that CIS assets may be held in a permissible "omnibus account"). The consequences of these risks could result in the ownership of the assets being called into question in the event of misuse or insolvency of the custodian, which may create difficulties differentiating ownership of the assets*”. The positive and negative aspects of omnibus accounts are also mentioned on page 11 of the IOSCO [Survey of Regimes for the Protection, Distribution and/or Transfer of Client Assets – Final Report (FR05/11)](http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD351.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. According to Article 1(g) of the ESMA draft technical standards under CSDR (ESMA/2015/1457/Annex II), ‘investor CSD’ means a CSD that is a participant in the securities settlement system operated by another CSD or that uses an intermediary that is a participant in the securities settlement system operated by another CSD in relation to a securities issue (available at [www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2015-esma-1457\_-\_annex\_ii\_-\_csdr\_ts\_on\_csd\_requirements\_and\_internalised\_settlement.pdf](http://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2015-esma-1457_-_annex_ii_-_csdr_ts_on_csd_requirements_and_internalised_settlement.pdf)). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Article 39(2) and (3) of EMIR states the following: “*2. A CCP shall offer to keep separate records and accounts enabling each clearing member to distinguish in accounts with the CCP the assets and positions of that clearing member from those held for the accounts of its clients (‘omnibus client segregation’). 3. A CCP shall offer to keep separate records and accounts enabling each clearing member to distinguish in accounts with the CCP the assets and positions held for the account of a client from those held for the account of other clients (‘individual client segregation’). Upon request, the CCP shall offer clearing members the possibility to open more accounts in their own name or for the account of their clients*”. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. However, under Article 38(5) of the CSDR a CSD and its participant shall provide individual clients segregation for citizens and residents of, and legal persons established in, a Member State where required under the national law under which the securities are constituted as it stands at 17 September 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. These services are part of the core services of central securities depositories under Section A, point 2 of the Annex to Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 (“CSDR”). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 231/2013 of 19 December 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/438 of 17 December 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)