Reply form for the ESMA MiFID II/MiFIR Consultation Paper
Responding to this paper

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) invites responses to the specific questions listed in the ESMA MiFID II/MiFIR Consultation Paper, published on the ESMA website (here).

Instructions

Please note that, in order to facilitate the analysis of the large number of responses expected, you are requested to use this file to send your response to ESMA so as to allow us to process it properly. Therefore, please follow the instructions described below:

i. use this form and send your responses in Word format;

ii. do not remove the tags of type <ESMA_QUESTION_1> - i.e. the response to one question has to be framed by the 2 tags corresponding to the question; and

iii. if you do not have a response to a question, do not delete it and leave the text “TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE” between the tags.

Responses are most helpful:

i. if they respond to the question stated;

ii. contain a clear rationale, including on any related costs and benefits; and

iii. describe any alternatives that ESMA should consider

Given the breadth of issues covered, ESMA expects and encourages respondents to specially answer those questions relevant to their business, interest and experience.

To help you navigate this document more easily, bookmarks are available in “Navigation Pane” for Word 2010 and in “Document Map” for Word 2007.

Responses must reach us by 1 August 2014.

All contributions should be submitted online at www.esma.europa.eu under the heading ‘Your input/Consultations’.

Publication of responses

All contributions received will be published following the end of the consultation period, unless otherwise requested. Please clearly indicate by ticking the appropriate checkbox in the website submission form if you do not wish your contribution to be publicly disclosed. A standard confidentiality statement in an email message will not be treated as a request for non-disclosure. Note also that a confidential response may be requested from us in accordance with ESMA’s rules on access to documents. We may consult you if we receive such a request. Any decision we make is reviewable by ESMA’s Board of Appeal and the European Ombudsman.

Data protection

Information on data protection can be found at www.esma.europa.eu under the heading ‘Disclaimer’.
1. Overview

2. Investor protection

2.1. Exemption from the applicability of MiFID for persons providing an investment service in an incidental manner

Q1: Do you agree with the proposed cumulative conditions to be fulfilled in order for an investment service to be deemed to be provided in an incidental manner?

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2.2. Investment advice and the use of distribution channels

Q2: Do you agree that it is appropriate to clarify that the use of distribution channels does not exclude the possibility that investment advice is provided to investors?

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<ESMA_QUESTION_2>

2.3. Compliance function

Q3: Do you agree that the existing compliance requirements included in Article 6 of the MiFID Implementing Directive should be expanded?

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<ESMA_QUESTION_3>

Q4: Are there any other areas of the Level 2 requirements concerning the compliance function that you consider should be updated, improved or revised?

<ESMA_QUESTION_4>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_4>

2.4. Complaints-handling
Q5: Do you already have in place arrangements that comply with the requirements set out in the draft technical advice set out above?

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<ESMA_QUESTION_5>

2.5. Record-keeping (other than recording of telephone conversations or other electronic communications)

Q6: Do you consider that additional records should be mentioned in the minimum list proposed in the table in the draft technical advice above? Please list any additional records that could be added to the minimum list for the purposes of MiFID II, MiFIR, MAD or MAR.

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Q7: What, if any, additional costs and/or benefits do you envisage arising from the proposed approach? Please quantify and provide details.

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<ESMA_QUESTION_7>

2.6. Recording of telephone conversations and electronic communications

Q8: What additional measure(s) could firms implement to reduce the risk of non-compliance with the rules in relation to telephone recording and electronic communications?

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Q9: Do you agree that firms should periodically monitor records to ensure compliance with the recording requirement and wider regulatory requirements?

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<ESMA_QUESTION_9>

Q10: Should any additional items of information be included as a minimum in meeting minutes or notes where relevant face-to-face conversations take place with clients?

<ESMA_QUESTION_10>
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<ESMA_QUESTION_10>
Q11: Should clients be required to sign these minutes or notes?

Q12: Do you agree with the proposals for storage and retention set out in the above draft technical advice?

Q13: More generally, what additional costs, impacts and/or benefits do you envisage as a result of the requirements set out in the entire draft technical advice above?

2.7. Product governance

Q14: Should the proposed distributor requirements apply in the case of distribution of products (e.g. shares and bonds as well as over-the-counter (OTC) products) available on the primary market or should they also apply to distribution of products on the secondary market (e.g. freely tradable shares and bonds)? Please state the reason for your answer.

It seems that the general approach of ESMA is to increase the responsibility of distributors. We are very sceptical about this idea. There is no legal backing for this approach in the MiFID II directive and there is no reason why manufacturers shall be protected and advisors, portfolio managers and distributors are overburdened.

This seems especially true regarding Point 27 of the Draft technical advice: Where different firms work together in the distribution of a product, the final distributor is supposed to have “ultimate” responsibility to meet the product governance obligations. This seems to indicate that the distributor has the ultimate responsibility for the product governance of the manufacturer. This is far beyond the MiFID II obligations. MiFID II obliges manufacturers to have internal organisations about product governance and distributors to obtain the information and to understand the characteristics and the target market. We therefore request that a) where different firms work together in the distribution of a product, the ultimate “distributor” responsibility is up to the final distributor and b) it is made clear that the responsibility of the distributor includes only the obligations set forth in MiFID II. ESMA should give advice what kind of characteristics the distributor has to know and how manufacturers have to describe the target market.

Q15: When products are manufactured by non-MiFID firms or third country firms and public information is not available, should there be a requirement for a written agreement under which the manufacturer must provide all relevant product information to the distributor?

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
Q16: Do you think it would be useful to require distributors to periodically inform the manufacturer about their experience with the product? If yes, in what circumstances and what specific information could be provided by the distributor?

There should be no formal enforcement that distributors have to answer manufacturer. We do not see added value of periodical obligatory information to the manufacturer. Furthermore, this is to be questioned in the light of the new "independent service". How could a distributor be independent if he has to report and help the manufacturers? This is again problematic especially for smaller firms. If distributors have to report to manufacturer they might be inclined to reduce the number of manufacturers to reduce the reporting obligation. That would contradict the intention for more diverse and independent distributors. It is unclear if the independent advisor has to inform the client about the flow of information. If so, how will clients react if their independent advisor has to inform the manufacturer about their client data? How is the information service being remunerated? Are distributors asked to work for the manufacturer without remuneration?

Q17: What appropriate action do you think manufacturers can take if they become aware that products are not sold as envisaged (e.g. if the product is being widely sold to clients outside of the product’s target market)?

Q18: What appropriate action do you think distributors can take, if they become aware of any event that could materially affect the potential risk to the identified target market (e.g. if the distributor has mis-judged the target market for a specific product)?

Q19: Do you consider that there is sufficient clarity regarding the requirements of investment firms when acting as manufacturers, distributors or both? If not, please provide details of how such requirements should interact with each other.

Q20: Are there any other product governance requirements not mentioned in this paper that you consider important and should be considered? If yes, please set out these additional requirements.

Q21: For investment firms responding to this consultation, what costs would you incur in order to meet these requirements, either as distributors or manufacturers?
2.8. Safeguarding of client assets

Q22: Do you agree with the proposal for investment firms to establish and maintain a client assets oversight function?

Q23: What would be the cost implications of establishing and maintaining a function with specific responsibility for matters relating to the firm’s compliance with its obligations regarding the safeguarding of client instruments and funds?

Q24: Do you think that the examples in this chapter constitute an inappropriate use of TTCA? If not, why not? Are there any other examples of inappropriate use of or features of inappropriate use of TTCA?

Q25: Do you agree with the proposal to clarify that the use of TTCA is not a freely available option for avoiding the protections required under MiFID? Do you agree with the proposal to place high-level requirements on firms to consider the appropriateness of TTCA? Should risk disclosures be required in this area? Please explain your answer. If not, why not?

Q26: Do you agree with the proposal to require a reasonable link between the client’s obligation and the financial instruments or funds subject to TTCA?

Q27: Do you already make any assessment of the suitability of TTCAs? If not, would you need to change any processes to meet such a requirement, and if so, what would be the cost implications of doing so?
Q28: Are any further measures needed to ensure that the transactions envisaged under Article 19 of the MiFID Implementing Directive remain possible in light of the ban on concluding TTCAs with retail clients in Article 16(10) of MiFID II?

Q29: Do you agree with the proposal to require firms to adopt specific arrangements to take appropriate collateral, monitor and maintain its appropriateness in respect of securities financing transactions?

Q30: Is it suitable to place collateral, monitoring and maintaining measures on firms in respect of retail clients only, or should these be extended to all classes of client?

Q31: Do you already take collateral against securities financing transactions and monitor its appropriateness on an on-going basis? If not, what would be the cost of developing and maintaining such arrangements?

Q32: Do you agree that investment firms should evidence the express prior consent of non-retail clients to the use of their financial instruments as they are currently required to do so for retail clients clearly, in writing or in a legally equivalent alternative means, and affirmatively executed by the client? Are there any cost implications?

Q33: Do you anticipate any additional costs in order to comply with the requirements proposed in relation to securities financing transactions and collateralisation? If yes, please provide details.

Q34: Do you think that it is proportionate to require investment firms to consider diversification of client funds as part of the due diligence requirements when depositing client funds? If not, why? What other measures could achieve a similar objective?
Q35: Are there any cost implications to investment firms when considering diversification as part of due diligence requirements?

<ESMA_QUESTION_35>

Q36: Where an investment firm deposits client funds at a third party that is within its own group, should an intra-group deposit limit be imposed? If yes, would imposing an intra-group deposit limit of 20% in respect of client funds be proportionate? If not, what other percentage could be proportionate? What other measures could achieve similar objectives? What is the rationale for this percentage?

<ESMA_QUESTION_36>

Q37: Are there any situations that would justify exempting an investment firm from such a rule restricting intra-group deposits in respect of client funds, for example, when other safeguards are in place?

<ESMA_QUESTION_37>

Q38: Do you place any client funds in a credit institution within your group? If so, what proportion of the total?

<ESMA_QUESTION_38>

Q39: What would be the cost implications for investment firms of diversifying holdings away from a group credit institution?

<ESMA_QUESTION_39>

Q40: What would be the impact of restricting investment firms in respect of the proportion of funds they could deposit at affiliated credit institutions? Could there be any unintended consequences?

<ESMA_QUESTION_40>

Q41: What would be the cost implications to credit institutions if investment firms were limited in respect of depositing client funds at credit institutions in the same group?

<ESMA_QUESTION_41>
Q42: Do you agree with the proposal to prevent firms from agreeing to liens that allow a third party to recover costs from client assets that do not relate to those clients, except where this is required in a particular jurisdiction?

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<ESMA_QUESTION_42>

Q43: Do you agree with the proposal to specify specific risk warnings where firms are obliged to agree to wide-ranging liens exposing their clients to the risk?

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<ESMA_QUESTION_43>

Q44: What would be the one off costs of reviewing third party agreements in the light of an explicit prohibition of such liens, and the on-going costs in respect of risk warnings to clients?

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Q45: Should firms be obliged to record the presence of security interests or other encumbrances over client assets in their own books and records? Are there any reasons why firms might not be able to meet such a requirement? Are there any cost implications of recording these?

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Q46: Should the option of ‘other equivalent measures’ for segregation of client financial instruments only be available in third country jurisdictions where market practice or legal requirements make this necessary?

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<ESMA_QUESTION_46>

Q47: Should firms be required to develop additional systems to mitigate the risks of ‘other equivalent measures’ and require specific risk disclosures to clients where a firm must rely on such ‘other equivalent measures’, where not already covered by the Article 32(4) of the MiFID Implementing Directive?

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Q48: What would be the on-going costs of making disclosures to clients when relying on ‘other equivalent measures’?

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Q49: Should investment firms be required to maintain systems and controls to prevent shortfalls in client accounts and to prevent the use of one client’s financial instruments to settle the transactions of another client, including:

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<ESMA_QUESTION_49>

Q50: Do you already have measures in place that address the proposals in this chapter? What would be the one-off and on-going cost implications of developing systems and controls to address these proposals?

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<ESMA_QUESTION_50>

Q51: Do you agree that requiring firms to hold necessary information in an easily accessible way would reduce uncertainty regarding ownership and delays in returning client financial instruments and funds in the event of an insolvency?

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Q52: Do you think the information detailed in the draft technical advice section of this chapter is suitable for including in such a requirement?

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<ESMA_QUESTION_52>

Q53: Do you already maintain the information listed in a way that would be easily accessible on request by a competent person, either before or after insolvency? What would be the cost of maintaining such information in a way that is easily accessible to an insolvency practitioner in the event of firm failure?

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2.9. Conflicts of interest

Q54: Should investment firms be required to assess and periodically review - at least annually - the conflicts of interest policy established, taking all appropriate measures to address any deficiencies? Please also state the reason for your answer.

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Q55: Do you consider that additional situations to those identified in Article 21 of the MiFID Implementing Directive should be mentioned in the measures implementing MiFID II? Please explain your rationale for any additional suggestions.
Q56: Do you consider that the distinction between investment research and marketing communications drawn in Article 24 of the MiFID Implementing Directive is sufficient and sufficiently clear? If not, please suggest any improvements to the existing framework and the rationale for your proposals.

Q57: Do you consider that the additional organisational requirements listed in Article 25 of the MiFID Implementing Directive and addressed to firms producing and disseminating investment research are sufficient to properly regulate the specificities of these activities and to protect the objectivity and independence of financial analysts and of the investment research they produce? If not, please suggest any improvements to the existing framework and the rationale for your proposals.

2.10. Underwriting and placing – conflicts of interest and provision of information to clients

Q58: Are there additional details or requirements you believe should be included?

Q59: Do you consider that investment firms should be required to discuss with the issuer client any hedging strategies they plan to undertake with respect to the offering, including how these strategies may impact the issuer client's interest? If not, please provide your views on possible alternative arrangements. In addition to stabilisation, what other trading strategies might the firm take in connection with the offering that would impact the issuer?

Q60: Have you already put in place organisational arrangements that comply with these requirements?

Q61: How would you need to change your processes to meet the requirements?
2.11. Remuneration

Q63: Do you agree with the definition of the scope of the requirements as proposed? If not, why not?

Q64: Do you agree with the proposal with respect to variable remuneration and similar incentives? If not, why not?

2.12. Fair, clear and not misleading information

Q65: Do you agree that the information to retail clients should be up-to-date, consistently presented in the same language, and in the same font size in order to be fair, clear and not misleading?

Q66: Do you agree that the information about future performance should be provided under different performance scenarios in order to illustrate the potential functioning of financial instruments?

Q67: Do you agree that the information to professional clients should comply with the proposed conditions in order to be fair, clear and not misleading? Do you consider that the information to professional clients should meet any of the other conditions proposed for retail clients?
2.13. Information to clients about investment advice and financial instruments

Q68: Do you agree with the objective of the above proposals to clarify the distinction between independent and non-independent advice for investors?

Q69: Do you agree with the proposal to further specify information provided to clients about financial instruments and their risks?

Q70: Do you consider that, in addition to the information requirements suggested in this CP (including information on investment advice, financial instruments, costs and charges and safeguarding of client assets), further improvements to the information requirements in other areas should be proposed? If yes, please specify, by making reference to existing requirements in the MiFID Implementing directive.

2.14. Information to clients on costs and charges

Q71: Do you agree with the proposal to fully apply requirements on information to clients on costs and charges to professional clients and eligible counterparties and to allow these clients to opt-out from the application of these requirements in certain circumstances?

Q72: Do you agree with the scope of the point of sale information requirements?

Q73: Do you agree that post-sale information should be provided where the investment firm has established a continuing relationship with the client?
Q74: Do you agree with the proposed costs and charges to be disclosed to clients, as listed in the Annex to this chapter? If not please state your reasons, including describing any other cost or charges that should be included.

Q75: Do you agree that the point of sale information on costs and charges could be provided on a generic basis? If not, please explain your response.

Q76: Do you have any other comments on the methodology for calculating the point of sale figures?

Q77: Do you have any comments on the requirements around illustrating the cumulative effect of costs and charges?

Q78: What costs would you incur in order to meet these requirements?

2.15. The legitimacy of inducements to be paid to/by a third person

Q79: Do you agree with the proposed exhaustive list of minor non-monetary benefits that are acceptable? Should any other benefits be included on the list? If so, please explain.

Q80: Do you agree with the proposed approach for the disclosure of monetary and non-monetary benefits, in relation to investment services other than portfolio management and advice on an independent basis?
Q81: Do you agree with the non-exhaustive list of circumstances and situations that NCAs should consider in determining when the quality enhancement test is not met? If not, please explain and provide examples of circumstances and situations where you believe the enhancement test is met. Should any other circumstances and/or situations be included in the list? If so, please explain.

Q82: Do you anticipate any additional costs in order to comply with the requirements proposed in this chapter? If yes, please provide details.

The consultation paper favours a broad interpretation of the prohibition of the acceptance and the retaining of fees, commissions or other monetary or non-monetary benefits provided by third parties with regard to the provision of investment advice on an independent basis or portfolio management. The Austrian Federal Economic Chamber is very sceptical about this approach. A broad interpretation of the prohibition should not be as far-reaching as to the extension of the ban on the acceptance, respectively retaining of fees, commissions or other monetary or non-monetary benefits with regard to the provision of portfolio management to a preceding investment advice on a non-independent basis or other, investment service. For example when non-independent investment advice is provided prior to the provision of portfolio management, it should be still allowed to accept and retain fees, commissions or other monetary or non-monetary benefit for the provision of non-independent investment advice in accordance with Article 24 para. 9.

The requirements foreseen in the consultation paper could be a “de facto”-ban which would lead to a pure fee-based advice that is (i) not in the interest of the clients and (ii) a barrier for competitive und dynamic markets and (iii) would have massive negative consequences for 88% of the Austrian investment firms for the following reasons:

- **Investment decision is complex:** The decision for the appropriate investment is complex, investment advice is vital especially for retail clients. However, these requirements may lead to a two-class-investor-system: Those investors being able to afford investment advice and those not being able to afford investment advice.

- **Inducements favour small investors:** In case of provision-based advice the client does not pay ex-ante fees. Therefore, it is much more likely that the investor will seek for advice (even from different advisors) and the probability of suitable investment decisions is higher compared to situations where the investor pays an advisory fee (fee-based system). On the contrary, if clients of investment firms would have to pay a fee to receive any kind of service, this will lead to a situation that many clients do not receive advice for their investments.

- **Less invested money:** A fee-based system focuses on wealthy investors and exclude retail investors (in particular small investors or savers) from access to any level of assistance in their search for an appropriate investment product. Thus, retail investors would – if at all – invest less. In the current low interest rate environment such development would be particularly disadvantageous for clients.

- **Importance of intermediaries:** Another area of concern with the “de-facto”-ban of inducements is that it completely ignores the value of financial intermediaries for both, the client receiving investment advice and the investment firm taking advantage of a wider distribution. Inducements are vital for financial intermediaries.
• **Distortion of competition**: A ban of monetary inducements would favour very large investment firms with their own in-house distribution units, because it is not necessary for them to pay inducements.

• **Negative consequences for investment firms**: 88% of Austria’s investment firms receive commission. For 44% of Austria’s investment firms this is their only means of income. The other 44% of investment firms who receive commission but also fees, receive around 80% of their income from commission. Therefore 88% of Austria’s investment firms depend on commission to pay the goods and services that are essential for the firm in its ordinary course of business. The 12% of Austria’s investment firm’s only charging fees, have less than 4% of the total business volume of Austria’s investment firms. Austria’s investment firms would – under the proposed regulation – have to either quit the market or charge fees. The majority of clients is not willing to pay fees. Studies show that only 2% of Austrians (n = 1000, from 2012) would be willing to pay a fee of 100 Euro or more even for an hour of “excellent” advice. Added to that show the numbers of those investment firms providing investment advice on fee and commission basis that only 20% of their income might be generated through fees. This is because most clients refuse that kind of payment system.

For 44% of the owners of Austrian investment firms this would be a total disappropriation. As their firms income is only commission and that income might not be used for the shareholders of the firm’s owner. This is mostly also true for the 44% owners of Austrian investment firms whose companies also charge fees as they only receive around 20% through fees, and this money would primarily have to pay the ordinary course of business. Therefore, 88% of investment firm’s owners would be disappropriated.

Furthermore, it is “interesting” to read the following in the draft technical advice 2.11 about variable remuneration:

“Remuneration and similar incentives may be partly based on commercial criteria, but should be principally based on criteria reflecting compliance with the applicable regulations, the fair treatment of clients and the quality of services provided to clients, so that an appropriate balance between fixed and variable components of remuneration is maintained at all times, and provided that in any event the remuneration structure does not favour the interests of the firm or its staff against the interests of any clients.”

This illustrates the totally different approach adopted between the proposed “principle based/rather flexible” treatment of “remuneration” for employees and the almost stigmatizing proposed treatment of payments/commissions to self-employed or small intermediary/advisory type of firms in the investment market.

Furthermore the ESMA proposal would lead in practice to a “ban on commissions” while the Directive – after the democratic process of many debates – has clearly resulted in a situation where only independent advice results in a ban on third party payments - leaving all options open for other forms of advice. This level II measure would thus result in a situation which is contrary to the level I objectives and philosophy.

We therefore request that the “Draft technical advice point 10.” is deleted and a new discussion on the interpretation is started.

Draft technical advice point 11 might be seen to remedy the strict obligation of point 10. We therefore agree with the direction of point 11. The following arguments dismiss point 11 as remedy in the current proposal:

• The criteria in 11 “could” be considered acceptable. This already indicates that the negative list of Point 10 is of a higher order. As it is proposed we have to assume that the negative list in Point 10 is more specific and therefore means that the application of it excludes the application of point 11. This renders situations for the application of point 11 almost completely useless.
There are two prerequisites for the application of point 11, service on an on-going basis or access to a wider range of suitable financial instruments. Both prerequisites are unclear and problematic.

It is unclear what a wider range of suitable financial instruments means. Is a wider range exceeding the own product range or the range available to the client? Clients sometimes have very specific wishes. What if no more than some products are suitable? What if only those products the client already has access to be suitable?

To force investment firms to advice on an on-going basis contradicts practicality. MiFID II has the option to tell your client if he will receive periodic advice or not. Whereas both options are open for independent and non-independent advice. This definition would lead to the practical situation whereas non-periodic advice is almost only open for independent advice. It is unclear why the concept of independence would lead to the situation that non-independent advice has to have a higher standard.

2.16. Investment advice on independent basis

Q83: Do you agree with the approach proposed in the technical advice above in order to ensure investment firm’s compliance with the obligation to assess a sufficient range of financial instruments available on the market? If not, please explain your reasons and provide for alternative or additional criteria.

Q84: What type of organisational requirements should firms have in place (e.g. degree of separation, procedures, controls) when they provide both independent and non-independent advice?

Q85: Do you anticipate any additional costs in order to comply with the requirements proposed in this chapter? If yes, please provide details.

2.17. Suitability

Q86: Do you agree that the existing suitability requirements included in Article 35 of the MiFID Implementing Directive should be expanded to cover points discussed in the draft technical advice of this chapter?
Q87: Are there any other areas where MiFID Implementing Directive requirements covering the suitability assessment should be updated, improved or revised based on your experiences under MiFID since it was originally implemented?

Type your text here

Q88: What is your view on the proposals for the content of suitability reports? Are there additional details or requirements you believe should be included, especially to ensure suitability reports are sufficiently 'personalised' to have added value for the client, drawing on any initiatives in national markets?

Type your text here

Q89: Do you agree that periodic suitability reports would only need to cover any changes in the instruments and/or circumstances of the client rather than repeating information which is unchanged from the first suitability report?

Type your text here

2.18. Appropriateness

Q90: Do you agree the existing criteria included in Article 38 of the Implementing Directive should be expanded to incorporate the above points, and that an instrument not included explicitly in Article 25(4)(a) of MiFID II would need to meet to be considered non-complex?

Type your text here

Q91: Are there any other areas where the MiFID Implementing Directive requirements covering the appropriateness assessment and conditions for an instrument to be considered non-complex should be updated, improved or revised based on your experiences under MiFID I?

Type your text here

2.19. Client agreement
Q92: Do you agree that investment firms should be required to enter into a written (or equivalent) agreement with their professional clients, at least for certain services? If yes, in which circumstances? If no, please state your reason.

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<ESMA_QUESTION_92>

Q93: Do you agree that investment firms should be required to enter into a written (or equivalent) agreement for the provision of investment advice to any client, at least where the investment firm and the client have a continuing business relationship? If not, why not?

<ESMA_QUESTION_93>
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<ESMA_QUESTION_93>

Q94: Do you agree that investment firms should be required to enter into a written (or equivalent) agreement for the provision of custody services (safekeeping of financial instruments) to any client? If not, why not?

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Q95: Do you agree that investment firms should be required to describe in the client agreement any advice services, portfolio management services and custody services to be provided? If not, why not?

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<ESMA_QUESTION_95>
2.20. Reporting to clients

Q96: Do you agree that the content of reports for professional clients, both for portfolio management and execution of orders, should be aligned to the content applicable for retail clients?

Q97: Should investment firms providing portfolio management or operating a retail client account that includes leveraged financial instruments or other contingent liability transactions be required to agree on a threshold with retail clients that should at least be equal to 10% (and relevant multiples) of the initial investments (or the value of the investment at the beginning of each year)?

Q98: Do you agree that Article 43 of the MiFID Implementing Directive should be updated to specify that the content of statements is to include the market or estimated value of the financial instruments included in the statement with a clear indication of the fact that the absence of a market price is likely to be indicative of a lack of liquidity?

Q99: Do you consider that it would be beneficial to clients to not only provide details of those financial instruments that are subject to TTCA at the point in time of the statement, but also details of those financial instruments that have been subject to TTCA during the reporting period?

Q100: What other changes to the MiFID Implementing Directive in relation to reporting to clients should ESMA consider advising the Commission on?
2.21. Best execution

**Q101:** Do you have any additional suggestions to provide clarity of the best execution obligations in MiFID II captured in this section or to further ESMA’s objective of facilitating clear disclosures to clients?

Q102: Do your policies and your review procedures already the details proposed in this chapter? If they do not, what would be the implementation and recurring cost of modifying them and distributing the revised policies to your existing clients? Where possible please provide examples of the costs involved.

2.22. Client order-handling

**Q103:** Are you aware of any issues that have emerged with regard to the application of Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the MiFID Implementing Directive? If yes, please specify.

2.23. Transactions executed with eligible counterparties

**Q104:** Do you agree with the proposal not to allow undertakings classified as professional clients on request to be recognised as eligible counterparties?

Q105: For investment firms responding to this consultation, how many clients have you already classified as eligible counterparties using the following approaches under Article 50 of the MiFID Implementing Directive:

Q106: For investment firms responding to this consultation, what costs would you incur in order to meet these requirements?
2.24. Product intervention

Q107: Do you agree with the criteria proposed?

<ESMA_QUESTION_107>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_107>

Q108: Are there any additional criteria that you would suggest adding?

<ESMA_QUESTION_108>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_108>
3. Transparency

3.1. Liquid market for equity and equity-like instruments

Q109: Do you agree with the liquidity thresholds ESMA proposes for equities? Would you calibrate the thresholds differently? Please provide reasons for your answers.

Q110: Do you agree that the free float for depositary receipts should be determined by the number of shares issued in the issuer’s home market? Please provide reasons for your answer.

Q111: Do you agree with the proposal to set the liquidity threshold for depositary receipts at the same level as for shares? Please provide reasons for your answer.

Q112: Do you agree with the liquidity thresholds ESMA proposes for depositary receipts? Would you calibrate the thresholds differently? Please provide reasons for your answers.

Q113: Do you agree that the criterion of free float could be addressed through the number of units issued for trading? If yes, what *de minimis* number of units would you suggest? Is there any other more appropriate measure in your view? Please provide reasons for your answer.

Q114: Based on your experience, do you agree with the preliminary results related to the trading patterns of ETFs? Please provide reasons for your answer.
Q115: Do you agree with the liquidity thresholds ESMA proposes for ETFs? Would you calibrate the thresholds differently? Please provide reasons for your answers, including describing your own role in the market (e.g. market-maker, issuer etc).

Q116: Can you identify any additional instruments that could be caught by the definition of certificates under Article 2(1)(27) of MiFIR?

Q117: Based on your experience, do you agree with the preliminary results related to the trading patterns of certificates? Please provide reasons for your answer.

Q118: Do you agree with the liquidity thresholds ESMA proposes for certificates? Would you calibrate the thresholds differently? Please provide reasons for your answer.

Q119: Do you agree that the criterion of free float could be addressed through the issuance size? If yes, what de minimis issuance size would you suggest? Is there any other more appropriate measure in your view? Please provide reasons for your answer.

Q120: Do you think the discretion permitted to Member States under Article 22(2) of the Commission Regulation to specify additional instruments up to a limit as being liquid should be retained under MiFID II?

3.2. Delineation between bonds, structured finance products and money market instruments

Q121: Do you agree with ESMA’s assessment concerning financial instruments outside the scope of the MiFIR non-equity transparency obligations?
3.3. The definition of systematic internaliser

Q122: For the systematic and frequent criterion, ESMA proposes setting the percentage for the calculation between 0.25% and 0.5%. Within this range, what do you consider to be the appropriate level? Please provide reasons for your answer. If you consider that the threshold should be set at a level outside this range, please specify at what level this should be with justifications.

Q123: Do you support calibrating the threshold for the systematic and frequent criterion on the liquidity of the financial instrument as measured by the number of daily transactions?

Q124: For the substantial criterion, ESMA proposes setting the percentage for the calculation between 15% and 25% of the total turnover in that financial instrument executed by the investment firm on own account or on behalf of clients and between 0.25% and 0.5% of the total turnover in that financial instrument in the Union. Within these ranges, what do you consider to be the appropriate level? Please provide reasons for your answer. If you consider that the thresholds should be set at levels outside these ranges, please specify at what levels these should be with justifications.

Q125: Do you support thresholds based on the turnover (quantity multiplied by price) as opposed to the volume (quantity) of shares traded? Do you agree with the definition of total trading by the investment firm? If not please provide alternatives and reasons for your answer.

Q126: ESMA has calibrated the initial thresholds proposed based on systematic internaliser activity in shares. Do you consider those thresholds adequate for:
Q127: Do you consider a quarterly assessment of systematic internaliser activity as adequate? If not, which assessment period would you propose? Do you consider that one month provides sufficient time for investment firms to establish all the necessary arrangements in order to comply with the systematic internaliser regime?

Q128: For the systematic and frequent criterion, do you agree that the thresholds should be set per asset class? Please provide reasons for your answer. If you consider the thresholds should be set at a more granular level (sub-categories) please provide further detail and justification.

Q129: With regard to the ‘substantial basis’ criterion, do you support thresholds based on the turnover (quantity multiplied by price) as opposed to the volume (quantity) of instruments traded. Do you agree with the definition of total trading by the investment firm? If not please provide alternatives and reasons for your answer.

Q130: Do you agree with ESMA’s proposal to apply the systematic internaliser thresholds for bonds and structured finance products at an ISIN code level? If not please provide alternatives and reasons for your answer.

Q131: For derivatives, do you agree that some aggregation should be established in order to properly apply the systematic internaliser definition? If yes, do you consider that the tables presented in Annex 3.6.1 of the DP could be used as a basis for applying the systematic internaliser thresholds to derivatives products? Please provide reasons, and when necessary alternatives, to your answer.

Q132: Do you agree with ESMA’s proposal to set a threshold for liquid derivatives? Do you consider any scenarios could arise where systematic internalisers would be required to meet pre-trade transparency requirements for liquid derivatives where the trading obligation does not apply?
Q133: Do you consider a quarterly assessment by investment firms in respect of their systematic internaliser activity is adequate? If not, what assessment period would you propose?

<ESMA_QUESTION_133>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_133>

Q134: Within the ranges proposed by ESMA, what do you consider to be the appropriate level? Please provide reasons for your answer. If you consider that the threshold should be set at a level outside this range, please specify at what level this should be with justifications and where possible data to support them.

<ESMA_QUESTION_134>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_134>

Q135: Do you consider that thresholds should be set as absolute numbers rather than percentages for some specific categories? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_135>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_135>

Q136: What thresholds would you consider as adequate for the emission allowance market?

<ESMA_QUESTION_136>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_136>

3.4. Transactions in several securities and orders subject to conditions other than the current market price

Q137: Do you agree with the definition of portfolio trade and of orders subject to conditions other than the current market price? Please give reasons for your answer?

<ESMA_QUESTION_137>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_137>

3.5. Exceptional market circumstances and conditions for updating quotes

Q138: Do you agree with the list of exceptional circumstances? Please give reasons for your answer. Do you agree with ESMA’s view on the conditions for updating the quotes? Please give reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_138>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_138>
3.6. Orders considerably exceeding the norm

Q139: Do you agree that each systematic internaliser should determine when the number and/or volume of orders sought by clients considerably exceed the norm? Please give reasons for your answer?

<ESMA_QUESTION_139>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_139>

3.7. Prices falling within a public range close to market conditions

Q140: Do you agree that any price within the bid and offer spread quoted by the systematic internaliser would fall within a public range close to market conditions? Please give reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_140>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_140>

3.8. Pre-trade transparency for systematic internalisers in non-equity instruments

Q141: Do you agree that the risks a systematic internaliser faces is similar to that of an liquidity provider? If not, how do they differ?

<ESMA_QUESTION_141>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_141>

Q142: Do you agree that the sizes established for liquidity providers and systematic internalisers should be identical? If not, how should they differ?

<ESMA_QUESTION_142>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_142>
4. Data publication

4.1. Access to systematic internalisers’ quotes

**Q143:** Do you agree with the proposed definition of “regular and continuous” publication of quotes? If not, what would definition you suggest?

<ESMA_QUESTION_143>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_143>

**Q144:** Do you agree with the proposed definition of “normal trading hours”? Should the publication time be extended?

<ESMA_QUESTION_144>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_144>

**Q145:** Do you agree with the proposal regarding the means of publication of quotes?

<ESMA_QUESTION_145>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_145>

**Q146:** Do you agree that a systematic internaliser should identify itself when publishing its quotes through a trading venue or a data reporting service?

<ESMA_QUESTION_146>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_146>

**Q147:** Is there any other mean of communication that should be considered by ESMA?

<ESMA_QUESTION_147>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_147>

**Q148:** Do you agree with the importance of ensuring that quotes published by investment firms are consistent across all the publication arrangements?

<ESMA_QUESTION_148>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_148>

**Q149:** Do you agree with the compulsory use of data standards, formats and technical arrangements in development of Article 66(5) of MiFID II?

<ESMA_QUESTION_149>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_149>
Q150: Do you agree with the imposing the publication on a ‘machine-readable’ and ‘human readable’ to investment firms publishing their quotes only through their own website?

Q151: Do you agree with the requirements to consider that the publication is ‘easily accessible’?

4.2. Publication of unexecuted client limit orders on shares traded on a venue

Q152: Do you think that publication of unexecuted orders through a data reporting service or through an investment firm’s website would effectively facilitate execution?

Q153: Do you agree with this proposal. If not, what would you suggest?

4.3. Reasonable commercial basis (RCB)

Q154: Would these disclosure requirements be a meaningful instrument to ensure that prices are on a reasonable commercial basis?

Q155: Are there any other possible requirements in the context of transparency/disclosure to ensure a reasonable price level?

Q156: To what extent do you think that comprehensive transparency requirements would be enough in terms of desired regulatory intervention?
Q157: What are you views on controlling charges by fixing a limit on the share of revenue that market data services can represent?

Q158: Which percentage range for a revenue limit would you consider reasonable?

Q159: If the definition of “reasonable commercial basis” is to be based on costs, do you agree that LRIC+ is the most appropriate measure? If not what measure do you think should be used?

Q160: Do you agree that suppliers should be required to maintain a cost model as the basis of setting prices against LRIC+? If not how do you think the definition should be implemented?

Q161: Do you believe that if there are excessive prices in any of the other markets, the same definition of “reasonable commercial basis” would be appropriate, or that they should be treated differently? If the latter, what definition should be used?

Q162: Within the options A, B and C, do you favour one of them, a combination of A+B or A+C or A+B+C? Please explain your reasons.

Q163: What are your views on the costs of the different approaches?

Q164: Is there some other approach you believe would be better? Why?
Q165: Do you think that the offering of a ‘per-user’ pricing model designed to prevent multiple charging for the same information should be mandatory?

Q166: If yes, in which circumstances?
5. Micro-structural issues

5.1. Algorithmic and high frequency trading (HFT)

Q167: Which would be your preferred option? Why?

Q168: Can you identify any other advantages or disadvantages of the options put forward?

Q169: How would you reduce the impact of the disadvantages identified in your preferred option?

Q170: If you prefer Option 2, please advise ESMA whether for the calculation of the median daily lifetime of the orders of the member/participant, you would take into account only the orders sent for liquid instruments or all the activity in the trading venue.

Q171: Do you agree with the above assessment? If not, please elaborate.

5.2. Direct electronic access (DEA)

Q172: Do you consider it necessary to clarify the definitions of DEA, DMA and SA provided in MiFID? In what area would further clarification be required and how would you clarify that?
Q173: Is there any other activity that should be covered by the term “DEA”, other than DMA and SA? In particular, should AOR be considered within the DEA definition?

Q174: Do you consider that electronic order transmission systems through shared connectivity arrangements should be included within the scope of DEA?

Q175: Are you aware of any order transmission systems through shared arrangements which would provide an equivalent type of access as the one provided by DEA arrangements?
6. Requirements applying on and to trading venues

6.1. SME Growth Markets

Q176: Do you support assessing the percentage of issuers on the basis of number of issuers only? If not, what approach would you suggest?

Q177: Which of the three different options described in the draft technical advice box above for assessing whether an SME-GM meets the criterion of having at least fifty percent of SME issuers would you prefer?

Q178: Do you agree with the approach described above (in the box), that only falling below the qualifying 50% threshold for a number of three consecutive years could lead to deregistration as a SME-GM or should the period be limited to two years?

Q179: Should an SME-GM which falls below the 50% threshold in one calendar year be required to disclose that fact to the market?

Q180: Which of the alternatives described above on how to deal with non-equity issuers for the purposes of the “at least 50% criterion” do you consider the most appropriate? Please give reasons for your answer.

Q181: Do you agree that an SME-GM should be able to operate under the models described above, and that the choice of model should be left to the discretion of the operator (under the supervision of its NCA)?
Q182: Do you agree that an SME-GM should establish and operate a regime which its NCA has assessed to be effective in ensuring that its issuers are “appropriate”?

Q183: Do you agree with the factors to which a NCA should have regard when assessing if an SME-GM’s regulatory regime is effective?

Q184: Do you think that there should be an appropriateness test for an SME-GM issuer’s management and board in order to confirm that they fulfil the responsibilities of a publicly quoted company?

Q185: Do you think that there should be an appropriateness test for an SME-GM issuer’s systems and controls in order to confirm that they provide a reasonable basis for it to comply with its continuing obligations under the rules of the market?

Q186: Do you agree with<br>Q187: Are there any other criteria that should be set for the initial and on-going admission of financial instruments of issuers to SME-GMs?

Q188: Should the SME-GM regime apply a general principle that an admission document should contain sufficient information for an investor to make an informed assessment of the financial position and prospects of the issuer and the rights attaching to its securities?

Q189: Do you agree that SME-GMs should be able to take either a ‘top down’ or a ‘bottom up’ approach to their admission documents where a Prospectus is not required?
Q190: Do you think that MiFID II should specify the detailed disclosures, or categories of disclosure, that the rules of a SME-GM would need to require, in order for admission documents prepared in accordance with those rules to comply with Article 33(3)(c) of MiFID II? Or do you think this should be the responsibility of the individual market, under the supervision of its NCA?

Q191: If you consider that detailed disclosure requirements should be set at a MiFID level, which specific disclosures would be essential to the proper information of investors? Which elements (if any) of the proportionate schedules set out in Regulation 486/2012 should be dis-applied or modified, in order for an admission document to meet the objectives of the SME-GM framework (as long as there is no public offer requiring that a Prospectus will be drafted under the rules of the Prospectus Directive)?

Q192: Should the future Level 2 Regulation require an SME-GM to make arrangements for an appropriate review of an admission document, designed to ensure that the information it contains is complete?

Q193: Do you agree with this initial assessment by ESMA?

Q194: In your view which reports should be included in the on-going periodic financial reporting by an issuer whose financial instruments are admitted to trading on an SME-GM?

Q195: How and by which means should SME-GMs ensure that the reporting obligations are fulfilled by the issuers?
Q196: Do you think that the more generous deadlines proposed for making reports public above (in the Box above, paragraph Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.) are suitable, or should the deadlines imposed under the rules of the Transparency Directive also apply to issuers on SME-GMs?

Q197: Do you agree with this assessment that the MiFID II framework should not impose any additional requirements/additional relief to those envisaged by MAR?

Q198: What is your view on the possible requirements for the dissemination and storage of information?

Q199: How and by which means should trading venues ensure that the dissemination and storage requirements are fulfilled by the issuers and which of the options described above do you prefer?

Q200: How long should the information be stored from your point of view? Do you agree with the proposed period of 5 years or would you prefer a different one (e.g., 3 years)?

Q201: Do you agree with this assessment that the MiFID II framework should not impose any additional requirements to those presented in MAR?

6.2. Suspension and removal of financial instruments from trading

Q202: Do you agree that an approach based on a non-exhaustive list of examples provides an appropriate balance between facilitating a consistent application of the exception, while allowing appropriate judgements to be made on a case by case basis?
Q203: Do you agree that NCAs would also need to consider the criteria described in paragraph ..., when making an assessment of relevant costs or risks?

<ESMA_QUESTION_203>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_203>

Q204: Which specific circumstances would you include in the list? Do you agree with the proposed examples?

<ESMA_QUESTION_204>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_204>

6.3. Substantial importance of a trading venue in a host Member State

Q205: Do you consider that the criteria established by Article 16 of MiFID Implementing Regulation remain appropriate for regulated markets?

<ESMA_QUESTION_205>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_205>

Q206: Do you agree with the additional criteria for establishing the substantial importance in the cases of MTFs and OTFs?

<ESMA_QUESTION_206>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_206>

6.4. Monitoring of compliance – information requirements for trading venues

Q207: Which circumstances would you include in this list? Do you agree with the circumstances described in the draft technical advice? What other circumstances do you think should be included in the list?

<ESMA_QUESTION_207>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_207>
6.5. Monitoring of compliance with the rules of the trading venue - determining circumstances that trigger the requirement to inform about conduct that may indicate abusive behaviour

Q208: Do you support the approach suggested by ESMA?

Q209: Is there any limitation to the ability of the operator of several trading venues to identify a potentially abusive conduct affecting related financial instruments?

Q210: What can be the implications for trading venues to make use of all information publicly available to complement their internal analysis of the potential abusive conduct to report such as managers’ dealings or major shareholders’ notifications)? Are there other public sources of information that could be useful for this purpose?

Q211: Do you agree that the signals listed in the Annex contained in the draft advice constitute appropriate indicators to be considered by operators of trading venues? Do you see other signals that could be relevant to include in the list?

Q212: Do you consider that front running should be considered in relation to the duty for operators of trading venues to report possible abusive conduct? If so, what could be the possible signal(s) to include in the list?
7. Commodity derivatives

7.1. Financial instruments definition - specifying Section C 6, 7 and 10 of Annex I of MiFID II

Q213: Do you agree with ESMA’s approach on specifying contracts that “must” be physically settled and contracts that “can” be physically settled?

:type your text here:

Q214: Which oil products in your view should be caught by the definition of C6 energy derivatives contracts and therefore be within the scope of the exemption? Please give reasons for your view stating, in particular, any practical repercussions of including or excluding products from the scope.

:type your text here:

Q215: Do you agree with ESMA’s approach on specifying contracts that must be physically settled?

:type your text here:

Q216: How do operational netting arrangements in power and gas markets work in practice? Please describe such arrangements in detail. In particular, please describe the type and timing of the actions taken by the various parties in the process, and the discretion over those actions that the parties have.

:type your text here:

Q217: Please provide concrete examples of contracts that must be physically settled for power, natural gas, coal and oil. Please describe the contracts in detail and identify on which platforms they are traded at the moment.

:type your text here:

Q218: How do you understand and how would you describe the concepts of “force majeure” and “other bona fide inability to settle” in this context?

:type your text here:
Q219: Do you agree that Article 38 of Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006 has worked well in practice and elements of it should be preserved? If not, which elements in your view require amendments?

Q220: Do you agree that the definition of spot contract in paragraph 2 of Article 38 of Regulation (EC) 1287/2006 is still valid and should become part of the future implementing measures for MiFID II? If not, what changes would you propose?

Q221: Do you agree that the definition of a contract for commercial purposes in paragraph 4 of Article 38 of Regulation (EC) 1287/2006 is still valid and should become part of the future implementing measures for MiFID II? If not, what changes would you propose? What other contracts, in your view, should be listed among those to be considered for commercial purposes?

Q222: Do you agree that the future Delegated Act should not refer to clearing as a condition for determining whether an instrument qualifies as a commodity derivative under Section C 7 of Annex I?

Q223: Do you agree that standardisation of a contract as expressed in Article 38(1) Letter c of Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006 remains an important indicator for classifying financial instruments and therefore should be maintained?

Q224: Do you agree with the proposal to maintain the alternatives for trading contracts in Article 38(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006 taking into account the emergence of the OTF as a MiFID trading venue in the future Delegated Act?

Q225: Do you agree that the existing provision in Article 38(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006 for determining whether derivative contracts within the scope of Section C(10) of Annex I should be classified as financial instruments should be updated as necessary but overall be maintained? If not, which elements in your view require amendments?
Q226: Do you agree that the list of contracts in Article 39 of Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006 should be maintained? If not, which type of contracts should be added or which ones should be deleted?

Q227: What is your view with regard to adding as an additional type of derivative contract those relating to actuarial statistics?

Q228: What do you understand by the terms “reason of default or other termination event” and how does this differ from “except in the case of force majeure, default or other bona fide inability to perform”?

7.2. Position reporting thresholds

Q229: Do you agree with the proposed threshold for the number of position holders? If not, please state your preferred thresholds and the reason why.

Q230: Do you agree with the proposed minimum threshold level for the open interest criteria for the publication of reports? If not, please state your preferred alternative for the definition of this threshold and explain the reasons why this would be more appropriate.

Q231: Do you agree with the proposed timeframes for publication once activity on a trading venue either reaches or no longer reaches the two thresholds?
7.3. Position management powers of ESMA

Q232: Do you agree that the listed factors and criteria allow ESMA to determine the existence of a threat to the stability of the (whole or part of the) financial system in the EU?

Q233: What other factors and criteria should be taken into account?

Q234: Do you agree with ESMA’s definition of a market fulfilling its economic function?

Q235: Do you agree that the listed factors and criteria allow ESMA to adequately determine the existence of a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or commodity derivative market so as to justify position management intervention by ESMA?

Q236: What other factors and criteria should be taken into account?

Q237: Do you consider that the above factors sufficiently take account of “the degree to which positions are used to hedge positions in physical commodities or commodity contracts and the degree to which prices in underlying markets are set by reference to the prices of commodity derivatives”? If not, what further factors would you propose?

Q238: Do you agree that the listed factors and criteria allow ESMA to determine the appropriate reduction of a position or exposure entered into via a derivative?

Q239: What other factors and criteria should be taken into account?
Q240: Do you agree that some factors are more important than others in determining what an “appropriate reduction of a position” is within a given market? If yes, which are the most important factors for ESMA to consider?

Q241: Do you agree that the listed factors and criteria allow ESMA to adequately determine the situations where a risk of regulatory arbitrage could arise from the exercise of position management powers by ESMA?

Q242: What other criteria and factors should be taken into account?

Q243: If regulatory arbitrage may arise from inconsistent approaches to interrelated markets, what is the best way of identifying such links and correlations?
8. Portfolio compression

Q244: What are your views on the proposed approach for legal documentation and portfolio compression criteria?

Q245: What are your views on the approach proposed by ESMA with regard to information to be published by the compression service provider related to the volume of transactions and the timing when they were concluded?