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Date Ref. Title Section Type Download Info Summary Related Documents Translated versions
29/06/2012 2012/415 Call for Evidence on Empty Voting Transparency, Corporate Disclosure CESR Document PDF
275.66 KB		 ESMA launched a Call for Evidence on Empty Voting in September 2011 to analyse the potential issues and concerns raised by the practice of empty voting and to examine whether there was a possible need for further action. An analysis of the responses received to the consultation has led ESMA to conclude that there is insufficient evidence to justify any regulatory action at the European level at present.
11/01/2013 EBA/REC/2013/01 EBA Recommendations on supervisory oversight of activities related to banks’ participation in the Euribor panel Risk Analysis & Economics - Markets Infrastructure Investors Reference PDF
207.84 KB
11/03/2013 2013/280 Vacancy notice- Chair of Committee drafting a proxy advising industry Code of Conduct Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance Reference PDF
102.91 KB
20/03/2013 2013/318 Feedback Statement on proposed amendments to the ESMA update of the CESR recommendations for the consistent implementation of the Prospectuses Regulation regarding mineral companies Prospectus, Corporate Disclosure, Transparency CESR Document PDF
265.19 KB
12/11/2013 2013/1643 Cover Note- Public statement containing information on shareholder cooperation and acting in concert under the Takeover Bids Directive (ESMA/2013/1642) Corporate Disclosure, Corporate Governance Reference PDF
145.01 KB		 In accordance with its mandate to take appropriate action in the context of takeover bids as per Article 1.3 of Regulation (EU) 1095/2010 (ESMA Regulation), ESMA is releasing a public statement on shareholder cooperation and acting in concert under the Takeover Bids Directive (Directive 2004/25/EC). This statement has been prepared following the review and report by the European Commission on the application of the Takeover Bids Directive and is based on information collected about the practices and application of that Directive. The statement has been prepared in order to help shareholders identify activities in relation to which they can cooperate (insofar as those activities are available to them under national company law), without that cooperation, in and of itself, leading to a conclusion that the shareholders are acting in concert and thus being at risk of having to make a mandatory bid under the Takeover Bids Directive. These activities are presented in the statement in the form of a “White List”. The statement has been prepared by the Takeover Bids Network, a permanent working group operating under the auspices of ESMA that promotes exchange of information on practices and application of the Takeover Bids Directive across the European Economic Area, thereby strengthening a common supervisory culture. The Takeover Bids Network is a specialist group composed of the national competent authorities appointed under the Takeover Bids Directive. The competent authorities represented on the ESMA Board of Supervisors are not in all cases appointed as competent authorities within the Takeover Bids Directive. The authorities not represented on the Board of Supervisors but competent within the area of takeovers are the Austrian Takeover Commission, the Irish Takeover Panel, the Oslo Stock Exchange of Norway, the Takeover Panel of Sweden and the Takeover Panel of the United Kingdom. These five authorities have contributed to the public statement and will have regard to it in the same manner as the other members of the Takeover Bids Network when assessing whether shareholders are acting in concert under their national takeover rules.
28/02/2014 2014/205 Call for expressions of interest: Group of Economic Advisers for ESMA’s Committee for Economic and Markets Analysis Risk Analysis & Economics - Markets Infrastructure Investors Reference PDF
158.95 KB		 The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is seeking to appoint new members to its Group of Economic Advisors (GEA) for the Committee for Economic and Markets Analysis (CEMA). This follows the expiry of the term of the current GEA. CEMA has established the GEA in order to benefit from the expertise of stakeholders specialised in the topics of financial stability and general economic research related to financial markets. CEMA looks to this group to provide it with advice regarding our work related to financial stability and economic background analysis for the regulatory and supervisory tasks of ESMA. The closing date for application is 25 April 2014.  Application form
11/06/2014 ESMA/WP/2 ESMA Working Paper- The systemic dimension of hedge fund illiquidity and prime brokerage Risk Analysis & Economics - Markets Infrastructure Investors Reference PDF
839.63 KB		 We analyse the potentially vulnerable and systemically relevant financial intermediation chain established by hedge funds and prime brokers. Our dataset covers the 306 largest global hedge funds and their prime brokers over the period July 2001 to December 2011. The study illustrates that hedge funds and prime brokers act as complementary trading partners in normal times. However, we observe that this form of financial intermediation may be severely impaired in times of market distress. This can be explained by the hoarding of liquid securities by prime brokers who are eager to avert runs by their clients.
11/06/2014 ESMA/WP/1 ESMA Working Paper- Monitoring the European CDS market through networks: Implications for contagion risks Risk Analysis & Economics - Markets Infrastructure Investors Reference PDF
1005.17 KB		 Based on a unique data set referencing exposures on single name credit default swaps (CDS) on European reference entities, we study the structure and the topology of the European CDS market and its evolution from 2008 to 2012, resorting to network analysis. The structural features revealed show bilateral CDS exposures describing growing scale-free networks whose highly interconnected hubs constitute both a strength and weakness for the stability of the system. The potential “super spreaders” of financial contagion, identified as the most interconnected participants, consist mostly of banks. For some of them net notional exposures may be particularly large relative to their total common equity. Our findings also point to the importance of some non-dealer/non-bank participants belonging to the shadow banking system.
29/09/2014 2014/1187 Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on major shareholdings and an indicative list of financial instruments subject to notification requirements under the revised Transparency Directive Corporate Disclosure, Transparency Technical Standards PDF
810.07 KB		 The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has published its draft Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) under the revised Transparency Directive relating to the notification of major shareholdings.
15/01/2015 ESMA/WP/2015/1 ESMA Working Paper- Real-world and risk-neutral probabilities in the regulation on the transparency of structured products Risk Analysis & Economics - Markets Infrastructure Investors Reference PDF
480.24 KB		 The price of derivatives (and hence of structured products) can be calculated as the discounted value of expected future payoffs, assuming standard hypotheses on frictionless and complete markets and on the type of stochastic processes for the price of the underlying. However, the probabilities used in the pricing process do not represent “real” probabilities of future events, because they are based on the assumption that market participants are risk-neutral. This paper reviews the relevant mathematical finance literature, and clarifies that the risk-neutrality hypothesis is acceptable for pricing, but not to forecast the future value of an asset. Therefore, we argue that regulatory initiatives that mandate intermediaries to give retail investors information on the probability that, at a future date, the value of a derivative will be higher or lower than a given threshold (so-called “probability scenarios”) should explicitly reference probabilities that take into account the risk premium (so-called “real-world” probabilities). We also argue that, though probability scenarios may look appealing to foster investor protection, their practical implementation, if based on the right economic approach, raises significant regulatory and enforcement problems.
14/09/2015 2015/1291 Risk Dashboard No. 3, 2105 Risk Analysis & Economics - Markets Infrastructure Investors Reference PDF
848.31 KB
25/09/2015 2015/1463 reply form ESEF Form to reply ESEF Corporate Disclosure, Transparency Reference DOCX
784.27 KB
25/09/2015 2015/1463 reply form ESEF CBA Form to reply ESEF CBA Corporate Disclosure, European Single Electronic Format, Transparency Reference DOCX
872.33 KB
25/09/2015 2015/1460 ESMA Final Report on DRAFT RTS on EEAP Transparency Technical Standards PDF
1.62 MB
22/10/2015 2015/1596 Standard form for disclosure of Home Member State Corporate Disclosure, Transparency Reference DOCX
344.53 KB		 bgcsdadeelesetfifrhrhuitltlvmtnlplptroslsksv
22/10/2015 2015/1597 Standard form for major holdings Corporate Disclosure, Transparency Reference DOCX
350.81 KB
22/10/2015 2015/1598 Indicative List of Financial Instruments Corporate Disclosure, Transparency Reference DOCX
338.2 KB
22/10/2015 2015/1599 ESMA briefing on amended TD documents Corporate Disclosure, Transparency Reference PDF
133.16 KB
16/12/2015 2015/1882 Risk Dashboard No. 4, 2015 Risk Analysis & Economics - Markets Infrastructure Investors Reference PDF
931.3 KB
17/12/2015 2015/1885 ESMA Briefing Note on ESEF CP European Single Electronic Format, Transparency Reference PDF
138.49 KB

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