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|09/01/2019||ESMA71-99-1084||Crypto-assets need common EU-wide approach to ensure investor protection||Innovation and Products, Press Releases||Press Release||PDF
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|11/01/2016||2016/28||Emergency measure by the Greek HCMC under Section 1 of Chapter V of Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps||Market Integrity, Short Selling||Opinion||PDF
Emergency measure by the Greek HCMC under Section 1 of Chapter V of Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps
II.Previous measures adopted by the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC)
On the adverse events or developments
ESMA considers that adverse developments which constitute a serious threat to market confidence in Greece could be understood as having considerably decreased with the successful completion of the share capital increase of Attica bank as announced by that bank on the 30th December 2015. Attica Bank has been the last of the five banks to undertake the re-capitalisation process envisaged under Greek law. It represented less than 1 % of the total market capitalisation of the 5 re-capitalised banks before the Attica capital increase and less than 7% after the increase. It also stands for a very small fraction of the Greek banking sector. Not surprisingly, and unlike the other banks mentioned in paragraph 10 above, Attica Bank is not a significant supervised entity under the direct supervision of the ECB.
Although acknowledging that the successful and full conclusion of all the Greek banks’ re-capitalisation is important in order to safeguard the stability of the financial system as a whole and of the Greek capital market, as well as the protection of investors, ESMA considers that given that the capital increase of Attica Bank is agreed, priced, subscribed and publicly announced on the 30th of December 2015, the threat to the financial stability of the bank, and more widely to the financial stability of the Greek financial market, is much less acute than in December 2015.
ESMA notes that the trading of the newly issued shares further to the completed capital increase has not started yet and thus there is a risk of increased volatility in the relevant market and that the confidence in the concerned bank could be affected if price movements were extreme. However, the evolution of the stock price of Attica Bank during the last month does not point towards, on average, a significant downward pressure on the prices. The volatility observed on Attica Bank is relative to the currently volatile stock markets in the EU.
In the trading figures of Attica Bank shares since late November 2015, it is evident that the trading volumes have reduced progressively but the price of the stock has not suffered from a downward price spiral. Only in one occasion (10 December2015) the stock price fell more than 10% in a single session. In general, looking at the last 30 trading sessions, the price has increased by 37%. In the last 10 trading sessions, the price has moved in an overall range (counting intraday minimum and maximum values) of 13% around the average closing price of the period. In terms of closing prices, the maximum fluctuation has been -3,97% since 22 December (observed on January 7 2016). Putting these moves in the context of quite volatile EU stock markets, linked to the international market trends, it is questionable whether the volatility of the stock price of Attica Bank could be qualified as extreme or even high. Obviously, one could argue that the price has found a support thanks, among other things, to the existing ban on short sales. While it is extremely difficult to isolate the price effect of the short selling ban with current data, it is ESMA’s view that, all in all, the pricing history of the stock does not give the impression of a highly fragile situation.
The main risk related with extreme volatility in a re-capitalisation exercise arises when the issuance price of the new shares and the allotment of the volume to be subscribed is not yet complete. In that scenario, significant (downward) price movements can dis-incentivise the investors that were considering to subscribe to new shares or can affect the issuance price in a manner that the re-capitalisation (in terms of the effective amount of funds to be received by the bank) can be put at risk. Once the pricing and the subscription are firm, price moves have a much lower impact on the success prospects of a re-capitalisation. They mainly affect the willingness of the new investors to hold their new shares or to sell them when the new shares start to trade. But the effects of this process on the financial stability of the entity are much less direct than when the volatility scenario precedes the establishment of the price and of the allotment of the capital increase. The latter was the prevalent scenario in most of the other occasions in which the measures of the HCMC was extended and on which ESMA issued positive opinions in the past. In ESMA’s opinion, such scenarios should be distinguished from the case at hand.
The question of whether the risk of falling prices on Attica Bank shares (which has not yet been observed) would endanger the orderly functioning of the whole Greek financial market and its integrity is not evident to ESMA, due to the small size of this particular institution and to the fact that the only pending element is the formal admission to trading of the new shares.
On the appropriateness and proportionality of the proposed measure
ESMA considers that the renewal of the emergency measure limited to the shares of Attica Bank is not appropriate and proportionate to address the above mentioned potential threat stemming from the volatility of the price of the market of Attica Bank shares. Given that the share capital increase of Attica Bank is firm and definitive as well as publicly known, ESMA considers that the prohibition of short sales in the shares of Attica Bank admitted to trading on the Athens Exchange will only serve the purpose of assisting in reducing market volatility until the final admission of the new shares and the first days of their trading. While this may be a positive goal, ESMA notes that the situation of Attica Bank is very different from the ones of the other Greek banks both in terms of quantitative significance with respect to financial stability (much smaller in the case of Attica Bank) and in terms of the timing in the process of re-capitalisation (given that only the final listing of the new shares is pending, as opposed to the fixing of the issuance price and the allotment of the subscriptions).
ESMA is thus of the view that there are alternative tools and measures, including those provided by Article 23 of the Short Selling Regulation consisting in a short term restriction of short selling in case of a significant fall in price, to address extreme market volatility concerns, should this volatility materialise in the coming days and more specifically risks of a downward spiral of the price of Attica shares. Those measures would be in ESMA’s opinion more appropriate and proportionate to address the risks that would arise from that situation than a total ban on short sales.
On the duration of the proposed measure
Considering the above negative opinion on the appropriateness and proportionality of the measure, ESMA is not further assessing the duration of the proposed renewal.
|29/01/2013||2013/149||Emergency measure by the Greek HCMC under Section 1 of Chapter V of Regulation No 236/2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps||Short Selling||Opinion||PDF
|30/04/2013||2013/542||Emergency measure by the Greek HCMC under Section 1 of Chapter V of Regulation No 236/2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps||Short Selling, Market Integrity||Opinion||PDF
|15/03/2018||15-3-18||ESAs weigh benefits and risks of Big Data||Innovation and Products, Press Releases||Press Release||PDF
|04/12/2018||ESMA71-99-1069||ESMA appoints a new Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group||Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group||Press Release||PDF
|01/07/2016||2016/1066||ESMA appoints new Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group||Press Releases, Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group||Press Release||PDF
The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has published the new list of members of its Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group (SMSG) following its approval by its Board of Supervisors. The selected individuals begin a 2½ year term on 1 July 2016 and will replace the group whose mandate expired on 30 June 2016.
The new SMSG will be composed of 30 individuals drawn from across 13 Member States and representing ESMA’s key stakeholder constituencies – financial market participants (10), employee representatives (2), consumer representatives (6), users of financial services (3), small and medium sized enterprises (2) and academics (7). The new SMSG will feature 27 new members. A number of the incoming members have served in the previous SMSG.
The SMSG was established according to ESMA’s founding regulation and facilitates consultation between ESMA and its key financial market stakeholders on its work. The SMSG provides ESMA with opinions and advice on its policy work and must be consulted on technical standards and guidelines and recommendations. Additionally, it can inform ESMA of any inconsistent application of European Union law as well as inconsistent supervisory practices in Member States.
|12/12/2013||2013/1909||ESMA appoints new Securities Markets Stakeholders Group members||Press Releases, Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group||Press Release||PDF
|ESMA appoints new Securities Markets Stakeholders Group members The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has announced the composition of its Securities Markets Stakeholder Group (SMSG) following its approval by ESMA’s Board of Supervisors. These individuals will begin a term of 2½ years on 1 January 2014 and will replace the group whose mandate expires on 31 December 2013. The new SMSG will be composed of 30 individuals drawn from across 17 Member States and representing ESMA’s key stakeholder constituencies – consumer representatives (4), users of financial services (5), financial market participants (10), financial institution employees (2), small and medium sized enterprises (1) and academics (8). A number of the incoming members have previously served in the first SMSG. The SMSG was set up to facilitate consultation with key financial market stakeholders on all aspects of ESMA’s work. The SMSG provides ESMA with opinions and advice on policy workstreams and must be consulted on technical standards and guidelines and recommendations. In addition, the Stakeholder Group is expected to notify ESMA of any inconsistent application of European Union law as well as inconsistent supervisory practices in the Member States. Steven Maijoor, ESMA Chair, said: “The SMSG makes an important contribution to ESMA’s policy development, providing us with timely and valuable input on how our regulatory activities may potentially affect the different users of financial markets. “We have enjoyed a very good working relationship with the outgoing members of the SMSG who, as well as contributing their views and experience to our policymaking discussions, have been pioneers in developing the role of their group as part of the new European System of Financial Supervision. I look forward to working with the SMSG’s new members on a host of challenging issues.” The SMSG meets at least four times a year, and in addition meets twice with ESMA’s Board of Supervisors. Their advice and opinions are published on ESMA’s website.|
|02/06/2016||2016/743||ESMA assesses usefulness of distributed ledger technologies||Innovation and Products, Press Releases, Risk Analysis & Economics - Markets Infrastructure Investors||Press Release||PDF
|12/01/2017||ESMA71-844457584-322||ESMA calls for consistent application of MiFIR product intervention powers||Innovation and Products||Press Release||PDF
|12/11/2013||2013/1645||ESMA clarifies shareholder cooperation in takeover situations||Corporate Disclosure, Corporate Governance, Press Releases||Press Release||PDF
|ESMA clarifies shareholder cooperation in takeover situations The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has published a statement on practices governed by the Takeover Bid Directive (TBD), focused on shareholder cooperation issues relating to acting in concert and the appointment of board members. The statement contains a White List of activities that shareholders can cooperate on without the presumption of acting in concert. It also contains information on how shareholders may cooperate in order to secure board member appointments by setting out factors that national authorities may take into account when considering whether shareholders are acting in concert. The statement is in response to a request by the European Commission for clarity on these issues, following its 2012 report on the application of the TBD. It is based on information collected about the TBD’s application and common practices across the European Economic Area (EEA). The statement was prepared by the Takeover Bids Network, a permanent working group, under ESMA’s auspices, that promotes the exchange of information on practices and application of the TBD across EEA. Steven Maijoor, ESMA Chair, said: “Today’s statement means that shareholders can now be confident that they can expect authorities to take a consistent approach across the EEA to their cooperative activities. This consistency should in turn provide the reassurance needed by shareholders for the effective, sustainable engagement that is one of the cornerstones of listed companies’ corporate governance model allowing them to hold their boards to account. “ESMA believes that ensuring a consistent and convergent supervisory approach to this issue will be instrumental in affording equality of treatment to shareholders and investors across the EEA.” National competent authorities will have regard to the White List when determining whether shareholders are persons acting in concert under national takeover rules, but will also take into account all other relevant factors in making their decisions. Shareholder cooperation and acting in concert - The White List When shareholders cooperate to engage in any of the activities listed below, that cooperation will not, in and of itself, lead to a conclusion that the shareholders are acting in concert: 1. entering into discussions with each other about possible matters to be raised with the company’s board; 2. making representations to the company’s board about company policies, practices or particular actions that the company might consider taking; 3. other than in relation to the appointment of board members, exercising shareholders’ statutory rights; 4. other than in relation to a resolution for the appointment of board members and insofar as such a resolution is provided for under national company law, agreeing to vote the same way on a particular resolution put to a general meeting. If shareholders cooperate in an activity not included on the White List, this will also not result in an automatic assumption that they are acting in concert. Each case will be determined on its own particular facts. Cooperation in relation to the appointment of members of the board of a company The White List does not include any activity relating to cooperation on board appointments, due to differences in Member State approaches towards determining whether shareholders who cooperate in relation to board appointments are acting in concert. However, shareholders may wish to cooperate in order to secure board members’ appointment in a company in which they have invested. This cooperation might take the form of: 1. entering into an agreement or arrangement (informal or formal) to exercise their votes in the same way in order to support the appointment of one or more board members; 2. tabling a resolution to remove one or more board members and replace them with one or more new board members; or 3. tabling a resolution to appoint one or more additional board members. The statement therefore indicates which factors may be considered when assessing whether such cooperation is indeed an act of acting in concert. ESMA will keep the public statement under review in order to ensure that it continues to reflect accurately the practices and application of the TBD in the Member States. 2013/1642 Public Statement - Information on shareholder cooperation and acting in concert under the Takeover Bids Directive. 2013/1643 Cover Note to the Public Statement|
|03/06/2020||ESMA71-99-1334||ESMA consults on cloud outsourcing guidelines||Innovation and Products||Press Release||PDF
|30/09/2016||2016/1411||ESMA consults on future reporting rules for securities financing transactions||Post Trading, Press Releases, Securities Financing Transactions||Press Release||PDF
The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has issued today a consultation paper on draft technical standards implementing the Securities Financing Transaction Regulation (SFTR), which aims to increase the transparency of shadow banking activities. Securities financing transactions (SFTs) are transactions where securities are used to borrow cash (or other higher investment-grade securities), or vice versa – this includes repurchase transactions, securities lending and sell/buy-back transactions.
|17/09/2012||2012/582||ESMA consults on market maker and primary dealer exemption for short selling||Short Selling, Press Releases||Press Release||PDF
|15/04/2021||ESMA71-99-1651||ESMA highlights need for increased efforts on EMIR and SFTR data quality||Market data, Press Releases, Securities Financing Transactions, Supervisory convergence||Press Release||PDF
|15/02/2019||ESMA71-99-1115||ESMA IOSCO Statement on EDPB Opinion||Corporate Governance, International cooperation||Press Release||PDF
|27/03/2014||2014/334||ESMA issues good practices for structured retail product governance||MiFID - Investor Protection, Innovation and Products||Press Release||PDF
|The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has published an opinion on structured retail products, setting out good practices for firms when manufacturing and distributing these products.|
|01/02/2013||2013/167||ESMA issues guidelines on market-making and primary dealer exemptions||Short Selling, Press Releases||Press Release||PDF