ESMA LIBRARY

The ESMA Library contains all ESMA documents. Please use the search and filter options to find specific documents.
140
DOCUMENTS

REFINE YOUR SEARCH

Sections

Type of document

Your filters
Short Selling X Securities Financing Transactions X Corporate Governance X Risk Analysis & Economics - Markets Infrastructure Investors X Post Trading X Annual Report X Reference X
Reset all filters

Pages

Date Ref. Title Section Type Download Info Summary Related Documents Translated versions
19/10/2012 2012/680 Links to national websites for the purpose of the notification of net short positions Reference PDF
84.12 KB
10/12/2012 ESMA SSR Review mandate Formal request to ESMA for technical advice on the evalutation of the short selling regulation Reference PDF
34.44 KB
11/01/2013 EBA/REC/2013/01 EBA Recommendations on supervisory oversight of activities related to banks’ participation in the Euribor panel Reference PDF
207.84 KB
11/03/2013 2013/280 Vacancy notice- Chair of Committee drafting a proxy advising industry Code of Conduct , Reference PDF
102.91 KB
24/05/2013 request for technical advice Request from the European Commission for ESMA’s technical advice on procedural rules for taking supervisory measures and imposing fines on trade repositories Reference PDF
626.54 KB
07/11/2013 MARKT/G2/PSDM/bh (2013) 3663122 EC letter to ESMA on reporting of ETDs Reference PDF
430.71 KB
12/11/2013 2013/1643 Cover Note- Public statement containing information on shareholder cooperation and acting in concert under the Takeover Bids Directive (ESMA/2013/1642) , Reference PDF
145.01 KB
In accordance with its mandate to take appropriate action in the context of takeover bids as per Article 1.3 of Regulation (EU) 1095/2010 (ESMA Regulation), ESMA is releasing a public statement on shareholder cooperation and acting in concert under the Takeover Bids Directive (Directive 2004/25/EC). This statement has been prepared following the review and report by the European Commission on the application of the Takeover Bids Directive and is based on information collected about the practices and application of that Directive. The statement has been prepared in order to help shareholders identify activities in relation to which they can cooperate (insofar as those activities are available to them under national company law), without that cooperation, in and of itself, leading to a conclusion that the shareholders are acting in concert and thus being at risk of having to make a mandatory bid under the Takeover Bids Directive. These activities are presented in the statement in the form of a “White List”. The statement has been prepared by the Takeover Bids Network, a permanent working group operating under the auspices of ESMA that promotes exchange of information on practices and application of the Takeover Bids Directive across the European Economic Area, thereby strengthening a common supervisory culture. The Takeover Bids Network is a specialist group composed of the national competent authorities appointed under the Takeover Bids Directive. The competent authorities represented on the ESMA Board of Supervisors are not in all cases appointed as competent authorities within the Takeover Bids Directive. The authorities not represented on the Board of Supervisors but competent within the area of takeovers are the Austrian Takeover Commission, the Irish Takeover Panel, the Oslo Stock Exchange of Norway, the Takeover Panel of Sweden and the Takeover Panel of the United Kingdom. These five authorities have contributed to the public statement and will have regard to it in the same manner as the other members of the Takeover Bids Network when assessing whether shareholders are acting in concert under their national takeover rules.
28/02/2014 2014/205 Call for expressions of interest: Group of Economic Advisers for ESMA’s Committee for Economic and Markets Analysis Reference PDF
158.95 KB
The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is seeking to appoint new members to its Group of Economic Advisors (GEA) for the Committee for Economic and Markets Analysis (CEMA). This follows the expiry of the term of the current GEA. CEMA has established the GEA in order to benefit from the expertise of stakeholders specialised in the topics of financial stability and general economic research related to financial markets. CEMA looks to this group to provide it with advice regarding our work related to financial stability and economic background analysis for the regulatory and supervisory tasks of ESMA. The closing date for application is 25 April 2014.  Application form
01/04/2014 2014/336 Trade Repository Supervision Work Plan 2014 Reference PDF
111.34 KB

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is publishing a summary of its 2014 supervisory work plan in relation to trade repositories (TRs) with the aim of enhancing the transparency of its actions regarding TRs in the European Union. TRs centrally collect and maintain the records of derivative trades and play a central role in enhancing the transparency of derivative markets and reducing risks to financial stability. In November 2013, ESMA registered six TRs. The obligation for counterparties to report their derivative trades to registered TRs began on 12 February 2014. Under Titles VI and VII of Regulation EU 648/2012 (EMIR), the direct supervision of TRs has been entrusted to ESMA, who has started to supervise the six registered TRs. Supervision of TRs by ESMA is crucial to ensuring that TRs comply on an on-going basis with all EMIR requirements, thereby enabling regulators to access data and details of derivative contracts in order for them to fulfil their respective mandates.

11/06/2014 ESMA/WP/2 ESMA Working Paper- The systemic dimension of hedge fund illiquidity and prime brokerage Reference PDF
839.63 KB
We analyse the potentially vulnerable and systemically relevant financial intermediation chain established by hedge funds and prime brokers. Our dataset covers the 306 largest global hedge funds and their prime brokers over the period July 2001 to December 2011. The study illustrates that hedge funds and prime brokers act as complementary trading partners in normal times. However, we observe that this form of financial intermediation may be severely impaired in times of market distress. This can be explained by the hoarding of liquid securities by prime brokers who are eager to avert runs by their clients.
11/06/2014 ESMA/WP/1 ESMA Working Paper- Monitoring the European CDS market through networks: Implications for contagion risks Reference PDF
1005.17 KB
Based on a unique data set referencing exposures on single name credit default swaps (CDS) on European reference entities, we study the structure and the topology of the European CDS market and its evolution from 2008 to 2012, resorting to network analysis. The structural features revealed show bilateral CDS exposures describing growing scale-free networks whose highly interconnected hubs constitute both a strength and weakness for the stability of the system. The potential “super spreaders” of financial contagion, identified as the most interconnected participants, consist mostly of banks. For some of them net notional exposures may be particularly large relative to their total common equity. Our findings also point to the importance of some non-dealer/non-bank participants belonging to the shadow banking system.
07/11/2014 ODRG 7/11/14 Report of the OTC Derivatives Regulators Group (ODRG) to G20 Leaders on Cross-Border Implementation Issues Reference PDF
460.72 KB
19/12/2014 EC 18/12/2014 annex Letter from European Commission- Annex with Amended draft RTS on clearing obligation for IRS Reference PDF
74.34 KB
15/01/2015 ESMA/WP/2015/1 ESMA Working Paper- Real-world and risk-neutral probabilities in the regulation on the transparency of structured products Reference PDF
480.24 KB
The price of derivatives (and hence of structured products) can be calculated as the discounted value of expected future payoffs, assuming standard hypotheses on frictionless and complete markets and on the type of stochastic processes for the price of the underlying. However, the probabilities used in the pricing process do not represent “real” probabilities of future events, because they are based on the assumption that market participants are risk-neutral. This paper reviews the relevant mathematical finance literature, and clarifies that the risk-neutrality hypothesis is acceptable for pricing, but not to forecast the future value of an asset. Therefore, we argue that regulatory initiatives that mandate intermediaries to give retail investors information on the probability that, at a future date, the value of a derivative will be higher or lower than a given threshold (so-called “probability scenarios”) should explicitly reference probabilities that take into account the risk premium (so-called “real-world” probabilities). We also argue that, though probability scenarios may look appealing to foster investor protection, their practical implementation, if based on the right economic approach, raises significant regulatory and enforcement problems.
16/02/2015 2015/280 ESMA supervision of Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories , , Annual Report PDF
891.95 KB
This document reports on the direct supervisory activities carried out by ESMA during 2014 regarding credit rating agencies (CRAs) and trade repositories (TRs) within the European Union (EU). It sets out ESMAs key areas of action during 2014 and outlines ESMA’s main priorities for 2015.
24/02/2015 MOC ESMA JFSA MoC ESMA and JFSA regarding CCPs Reference PDF
767.27 KB
27/08/2015 2015/1295 RP Response form for the Discussion Paper on Review of Article 26 of RTS 153/2013 Reference DOCX
781.64 KB
14/09/2015 2015/1291 Risk Dashboard No. 3, 2105 Reference PDF
848.31 KB
04/11/2015 EMIR VT EMIR validation table Reference XLSX
26.48 KB
06/11/2015 NFC no CT Notification of NFC no longer exceeding the clearing threshold Reference XLSX
50.16 KB

This notification may be submitted to ESMA (EMIR-notifications@esma.europa.eu) preferably in Excel format, using the form hereby by a non-financial counterparty that no longer exceeds the clearing threshold for any of the following: 

a)     OTC credit derivative contracts;   
b)     OTC equity derivative contracts;   
c)     OTC foreign exchange derivative contracts;   
d)     OTC interest rate derivative contracts; and  
e)     OTC commodity derivative contracts and other OTC derivative contracts not defined under points (a) to (d). 

Pages